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The concept of economic coercion-that a relationship or
transaction can be economically exploited for the benefit of some over
others-is elaborated at the intersection of economic theory and
economic realities, moral and political understandings of freedom,
jurisprudence and the lived application of the law to facts. As a
category of criminal and civil wrong, it has been directly and
indirectly adjudicated in a breathtaking array of contexts of private
and public ordering. Theories of economic coercion are decisive in
drawing the line between what constitutes labor market competition
and forced labor, which federal programs constitutionally encourage
state action and which unconstitutionally commandeer it, and
whether theft of natural resources violates international criminal
law. But what informs legal theories and conceptualizations of
economic coercion? How are economic theories and theories of
freedom written into the law through assessments of economic
coercion? How is economic coercive "force" understood? Despite the
central significance of the category of economic coercion in the
judicial regulation of society, no single scholarly account provides a
comprehensive assessment of the evolution and scope of the concept in
law. Nor have contemporary theorists of economic rights adequately
dealt with it.
Attempting the first broad, theoretical overview of its kind, this
Article draws from the strengths and limitations of three competing
philosophical and legal accounts of economic coercion in order to
elaborate a more robust conceptualization of economic coercion, but
also to integrate economic coercion claims within the broader
evolution and theorization of economic rights. Part I evaluates
philosophical theories of coercion in public and private law to hone a
minimal set of requirements for a theory of economic coercion. Part H
then evaluates legal accounts of coercion-specifically, the extensive
analysis of mutual coercion in the Legal Realist tradition-to
supplement those requirements and elaborate a model for
incorporating background conditions and distributional concerns.
After outlining the strengths and deficiencies of these existing
accounts, Part III turns to a third framework for conceptualizing
economic coercion within the international economic rights tradition.
It highlights its strengths in attending to systemic economic coercion
and establishing a framework for protecting economic rights as well
as its limitations in enforcing those rights through the progressive
realization model. Drawing from each of these accounts, Part IV
proposes that rights against economic coercion be viewed as
relational and distributional rights critical to the enforcement of
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economic rights protections. It argues for the benefits of integrating
economic coercion claims so understood within an economic rights
framework, moving beyond both liberty-focused and progressive
realization models of coercion towards a model of benchmarking
protections from coercion in horizontal, or private law, adjudication.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of economic coercion-that a relationship or
transaction can be economically exploited for the benefit of some
over others-is elaborated at the intersection of economic theory and
economic realities, moral and political understandings of freedom,
jurisprudence and the lived application of the law to facts. As a
category of criminal and civil regulation, it has been directly and
indirectly adjudicated in a breathtaking array of contexts of private
and public ordering, from determining whether a contractual
agreement was the result of duress, to deciding whether dominant
firms in the telecommunications industry must divest, to assessing
whether investments violate economic sanctions against foreign
regimes. Theories of economic coercion are decisive in drawing the
line between what constitutes labor market competition and forced
labor, which federal programs constitutionally encourage state
action and which unconstitutionally commandeer it, and whether
theft of natural resources violates international criminal law.'
But what informs legal theories and conceptualizations of
economic coercion? How are economic theories and theories of
freedom written into the law through assessments of economic
coercion? How is economic coercive "force" understood? Despite the
central significance of the category of economic coercion in the
judicial regulation of society, legal, historical and philosophical
scholarship has yet to provide a comprehensive account of the
evolution and scope of the concept in law. Nor have contemporary
theorists of economic rights in international human rights law
adequately dealt with it. While the concept of coercion itself has
1. JAMES G. STEWART, CORPORATE WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING THE PILLAGE
OF NATURAL RESOURCES (2011) (surveying doctrines of corporate liability for
pillage). See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (2001) (examining the
constitutionality of conditioning government benefits on waiver of constitutional
rights through the concept of coercion).
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received intermittent and focused attention in the legal and
philosophical literature, a full exploration of the meaning and
function of economic coercion in social ordering has not yet been
historically or conceptually examined across the contemporary legal
landscape to understand the systemic role it has played and
continues to play in regulating human relationships and resource
allocation.
This Article argues that the economic and intellectual
foundations that inform and define economic coercion as a legal
concept and process are a critical component of the study of economic
rights, and as such, legal scholarship must analyze the conceptual
framework that grounds economic coercion's use and utility.
Theories of economic coercion can neither be historicized nor remain
relevant for future adjudication and integration into economic rights
law without a critical understanding of the jurisprudence on
economic coercion as well as the intellectual history, economic theory
and realities informing judicial interpretation of facts and law.
While the Article draws on philosophical and legal investigations
into the idea of coercion, it opposes the dominant analytic
philosophical method of formulating hypotheses about coercion "at
various levels of generality and subjecting them to confirmation or
disconfirmation by the intuitive moral credibility of their various
substantive consequences, as well as by their coherence in
explaining those consequences."2 It also opposes accounts of
economic coercion that concentrate exclusively on liberty interests at
the expense of distributional concerns and policy. Instead, it argues
for situating economic coercion claims in the thick of competing and
historically-specific liberty and welfare interests, and framing the
economic rights claims that underlay them relationally in the
context of distributional concerns. Further, it argues for a layered
understanding of economic coercion, one that documents battles in
the courts to define and redefine economic relationships based on
competing understandings of economic causation, legal and ethical
conceptions of liberty, and political philosophical notions of
individual and collective power. An overarching evaluation of
2. Thomas Nagel, Foreword to ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
xii (2d ed. 2013). See also ANTHONY CHASE, LAW AND HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1999); Pierre Schlag, Rights in the Postmodern
Condition, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 263-64
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, eds., 1996).
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economic coercion across substantive areas of law is needed to reveal
the long tradition of "constitutive commitments" to economic rights
in U.S. and international law and enable the carving out of a much-
needed evaluative model for integrating economic coercion into
economic rights jurisprudence.3
This Article explores the parameters of legal and philosophical
understandings of economic coercion under three models. Part I
evaluates philosophical theories of coercion in public and private
law. It argues that while these accounts fail to thoroughly
conceptualize or elaborate the economic nature of coercion in public
and private law, they suggest a minimal set of requirements for a
theory of economic coercion. Part II then evaluates legal accounts of
coercion-specifically, the extensive analysis of mutual coercion in
the Legal Realist tradition-to supplement those requirements and
elaborate a model for incorporating background conditions. After
outlining the strengths and deficiencies of these existing accounts,
Part III turns to a third framework for conceptualizing economic
coercion within the international economic rights tradition. It
3. For "constitutive commitments," see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL
OF RIGHTS: FDR's UNFINISHED REvOLUTION 61-62 (2004) for a discussion of rights
lacking constitutional status but are "widely accepted and cannot be eliminated
without a fundamental change in social understanding." While no scholarly accounts
link U.S. economic coercion claim adjudication with the evolution of economic rights
within the human rights tradition, scholars have taken varying positions on the
U.S.'s commitment to such rights. See, e.g., Abdullahi A. An-Na'Im, Conclusion in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 428-
29 (A. An-Na'Im ed. 1995) (inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights in
Universal Declaration was because "Third World countries . . . insisted on . . .
recognition of individual economic and social rights"); ANTONIO CASSESE, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 35 (1994) (Western nations agreed to incorporate
economic rights into Universal Declaration only in "second stage"); Jack Donnelly,
The West and Economic Rights, in ECONOMIC RIGHTS: CONCEPTUAL, MEASUREMENT
AND POLICY ISSUES 37-45 (Shareen Hertel & Lanse Minkler, eds., 2007) (arguing
against "myth of Western opposition" to economic rights by tracing Western role in
development of Universal Declaration and International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights); GARETH STEDMAN JONES, AN END TO POVERTY?: A
HISTORICAL DEBATE (2004) (providing intellectual history of Western theorizations
of poverty); DANIEL WHELN, INDIVISIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 11-31 (2010)
(pointing to Roosevelt's "Economic Bill of Rights" and American Law Institute's
Statement of Essential Human Rights as important sources for Universal
Declaration); Sally-Anne Way, The 'Myth' and Mystery of US History on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 869 (2014) (documenting U.S. support
of economic rights during drafting of Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
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highlights its strengths in attending to systemic economic coercion
and establishing a framework for protecting economic rights, even in
the context of private law, but assesses its limitations in evaluating
those rights through the progressive realization model. Drawing
from each of these accounts, Part IV proposes that rights against
economic coercion be viewed as relational, distributional rights
critical to the enforcement of economic rights protections. It argues
for the benefits of integrating economic coercion claims so
understood within an economic rights framework, moving beyond
the progressive realization model and towards a model of
benchmarking protections from coercion in horizontal, or private
law, adjudication, requiring the application of proportionality and
reasonableness limitations to analysis of such claims as well as
compliance with anti-discrimination principles, equity, and the
general welfare. It finally proposes a broader historical assessment
of economic coercion claims across substantive areas of law to gauge
compliance with such obligations.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL AcCouNTs OF COERCION
The term "coercion" derives from the Latin com-, "together," and
arcere, "to shut up, restrain": coercere, to shut, restrain, or confine
together.4 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first
record of its modern use, cohercen, was in 1475.5 Throughout its
documented history, it has described the application of force to
control not just the conduct of others, but also their physical bodies,
thought, and ideas.6 While the word has a strong tradition of use in
4. "Coerce, v.," OED ONLINE (Oxford University Press, Dec. 2015), available at
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/35716?redirectedFrom=coerce&.
5. Id. It was used to describe how the Duke of Exeter was "coherced to take
the Bastyle for her deffence" "alle the comyns of [Paris] ... rebelled ayenst" him. THE
BOKE OF NOBLESSE: ADDRESSED TO KING EDWARD THE FOURTH ON His INVASION OF
FRANCE 69 (1860).
6. See Coercion, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (documenting
1537 usage in INSTITUTE OF A CHRISTIAN MAN L V B ("Noo man may kyll, or use
suche bodily cohercion, but onely princis"); 1600 usage by RICHARD HOOKER, OF
LAWES ECCL. POLITIE VIII, iii, §4 ('To fly to the civil magistrate for coercion of those
that will not otherwise be reformed"); 1651 usage by THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
III, xlii, 270 ("Winning men to obedience, not by Coercion, and Punishing; but by
Perswasion"); 1859 usage by JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY i., 21 ("The moral
coercion of public opinion")).
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the context of moral principle and religious belief, particularly in the
rise of theories of individual autonomy in the freedom of conscience
movement in seventeenth century England,7 it first took on an
explicitly political dimension in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan,
replacing self-governance by private conscience with the sovereign
as the "coercive power."8 These early modern and modern usages,
despite their disparate contexts, cohere around a common concept:
coercion was a force being applied, whether on the body or mind, to
confine together, to insist that there be a definition of relation
between one person or thing and another, or between one external
entity and the confined group of the nation.9
A. Philosophical Accounts of Coercion Through the Nineteenth
Century
Philosophical exploration of coercion through the nineteenth
century primarily concentrated on the coercive power of the state
and civil institutions, such as public opinion or the market. This
exploration has attended in only limited ways to economic coercion
specifically, providing no history or overarching theory to define or
understand economic coercion. 10 Still, by more broadly theorizing the
intersection of coercion and the law, the accounts provide a core set
of criteria for understanding state- and market-level coercion.
Coercion was primarily theorized as a problem of public law
within the exclusive purview of the state, used as a tool for
compelling or restraining conduct. 1 Beginning with Thomas
7. See RICHARD SORABJI, MORAL CONSCIENCE THROUGH THE AGES: FIFTH
CENTURY BCE TO THE PRESENT 127-166 (2014).
8. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84-85 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett 1994)
(1651). "[T]he bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger,
and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power; which in the condition of
mere nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears,
cannot possibly be supposed." Id. at 89. "[Bjefore the names of just and unjust can
have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the
performance of their covenants. . ." Id.
9. See Coercion, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10:2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
121 (1981).
11. See generally THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 96, art. 5 at 1020-
21 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947), at I-II, 'Treatise on
Law"; JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 13-14 (Wilfrid
E. Rumble ed., Cambridge University Press 1995) (1832); JEREMY BENTHAM, Of
2016]1 1077
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Aquinas, law was viewed as a means of using "force and fear" to hold
back those "found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily
amenable to words" so that they would "desist from evil-doing, and
leave others in peace," becoming "habituated in this way" and
"virtuous."12 Coercion thus served to explain and justify early
notions of sovereignty and the social utility of public law: Aquinas
argued that the law's coercive function must be "vested in the whole
people or in some public personage" rather than in private parties.13
Thomas Hobbes understood coercive power as synonymous with the
state, both in the state's formation and in its function of making and
preserving justice:
[W]here there is no coercive Power erected, that is, where
there is no Commonwealth, there is no Propriety; all men
having Right to all things: Therefore where there is no
Commonwealth, there nothing is Unjust. So that the nature
of Justice, consists in keeping of valid Covenants: but the
Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of
a Civil Power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: And
then it is also that Propriety begins.14
For Hobbes, coercion served to secure justice by creating a
commonwealth bound by enforcement of a network of rights. John
Locke, more wary of the state's monopoly on force, still viewed
political power as "a Right of making Laws, with Penalties of Death,
and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and
Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the
Laws In General, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1-2 (H.L.A. Hart
ed., 1970); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Paul Craig ed., 3d ed. 2012); Hobbes,
supra note 8; IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge University Press, 1996) (1797); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW
(Max Knight trans., 2009); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter
Laslett ed., 1988); J.R. LUCAS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS (1966); JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 13-14 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1851); NAGEL, Foreword to
NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 2; Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE
AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440-72 (Sidney Morgenbesser, et
al. eds., 1969), reprinted in ROBERT NOZICK, SOCRATIC PUZZLES 1-44 (1997); JOHN
RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).
12. AQUINAS, SUMMA, supra note 11, at Q. 95, art. 1.
13. Id. at Q. 90, art. 3.
14. HOBBES, supra note 8, at ch. 15, Of Other Laws of Nature.
[Vol. 83.10711078
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Community, in the execution of such Laws, ... and all this only for
the Publick Good."' 5 He understood coercive arrangements, such as
state enforcement of private property rights, as warranted so long as
"there is enough, and as good left in common for others."1 6 The law's
coercive power was thus a mechanism for ensuring compliance, but
also a means of protecting "the commons." Immanuel Kant more
explicitly described coercion as a tool used by the law to ensure
respect of others' rights, justifying state power in its ability to
require the defense of equal freedom of all subjects.' 7 Jeremy
Bentham also upheld law as coercive sovereign command, backed by
threats of force, to punish legal breaches.' 8
These accounts have in common a view of coercion as a
justificatory mechanism for explaining when and why the state may
properly deploy force to protect individual liberties and the collective
good. Coercion was framed in the exclusive context of public law.
John Stuart Mill, however, shifted the tradition's focus by pointing
to the ability of civil institutions, such as marriage, private
contracts, labor relations, to coerce with the same level of influence
as with state power.' 9 Mill viewed coercion as ranging from the
"physical force" of the state to the "moral coercion of public
opinion."20 For him, state coercion may be "warranted . . . in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of [mankind's] number"
through a principle of "self-protection." 21 But his more expansive
understanding dramatically rearranged the contexts in which
coercion could be examined. This understanding replaced the
dominant view of coercion with a nearly infinite set of horizontal
vectors where individuals deploy civil society institutions, public
opinion, and the law to restrain others' liberty.
Coercion received its most expansive conceptualization as a force
of social ordering outside the confines of state power in Marx's
15. LOCKE, supra note 11, at Book II, "Of Civil Government," ch. 1, § 3.
16. Id. at ch. 5, § 27.
17. KANT, supra note 11, at 20-26.
18. BENTHAM, supra note 11, at 1-2. See generally MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra
note 11, at 13.
19. Scott Anderson, Coercion, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHLOSOPHY
§1.3 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), http://plato.stanford.edularchives/Suim2O15
/entries/coercion.
20. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 11, at ch. 1.
21. Id.
10792016]
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analysis of the coercive laws of competition. 22 While Marx did not
fully expound these coercive laws, he understood them as systemic in
capitalist production, establishing and reinforcing surplus value
gains to the capitalist at the expense of the social value of labor and
the cheapened commodity. 23 Coercive laws did this by forcing the
capitalist to consistently increase labor productivity 24 following
capital's acquisition of command over labor:
Capital developed within the production process until it
acquired command over labour .... The capitalist, who is
capital personified, now takes care that the worker does his
work regularly and with the proper degree of intensity ...
[But] capital also developed into a coercive relation, and this
compels the working class to do more work than would be
required by the narrow circle of its own needs. 25
Capital coerces labor as the originary coercive relation, but the
capitalist is himself not immune from systemic coercion under the
coercive laws of competition in capitalist production. Where the
capitalist introduces a superior technology that doubles a worker's
productivity,
[tihis extra surplus-value vanishes as soon as the new
method of production is generalized, for then the difference
between the individual value of the cheapened commodity
and its social value vanishes. The law of the determination of
value by labour time makes itself felt to the individual
capitalist who applies the new method of production by
compelling him to sell his goods under their social value; this
same law, acting as a coercive law of competition, forces his
competitors to adopt the new method.26
For Marx, the coercive laws of competition are systemic: 'Under free
competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront the
22. KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITIcAL ECONOMY 343-418, 430-38
(Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Books 1990) (1867).
23. Id. at 436-37.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 424-25.
26. Id.
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individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him." 2 7 Marx thus
imagines a system of thoroughgoing coercion, effectuating a
philosophical reversal from describing coercion as state command of
the law to describing it in terms of laws of pervasive economic
command.
B. Coercion and the Law in Modern Analytic Philosophy
From the turn of the century, philosophical scholarship in the
American tradition developed conflicting accounts of coercion, some
viewing the law as fundamentally coercive, while others challenged
that view as ignoring the normative or experiential aspects of the
law's operation.28 The field further fractured as political realists and
others argued that geopolitical pressures and economic power
eviscerate the "law" as a formal, state-enforced system governing
conduct, placing in the law's stead descriptions, justifications, and
condemnations of "non-legal" coercion.29 Still, most accounts have
concentrated on the study of coercion in one of two ways. They have
focused on either contesting the inherent power of law as coercive
(macro-analysis) or investigating when specific conduct may be
deemed coercive (micro-analysis), roughly a public and private law
divide. The first set focus on how the law, understood through the
lens of coercion, "purports to govern conduct."30 This has involved
evaluating the role of coercion in defining what "the law" is. Micro-
27. Id. at 381. For further elaborations of coercion in Marx, see Jeffrey Reiman,
Exploitation, Force, and the Moral Assessment of Capitalism: Thoughts on Roemer
and Cohen, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1987).
28. Grant Lamond, Coercion and the Nature of Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 35, 36-
37, 54-55 (2001); Ekow Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal
Norms, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1195, 1195-96 (2008).
29. See, e.g., E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-939: AN
INTRODUCTION TO STUDY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2001); GEORGE F. KENNAN,
REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1951); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH
NYE, POWER AND INDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977); HANS
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE
(1954); REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF
ETHICS AND POLITICS (1932); KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1979). See also JACK DONNELLY, REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2000);
EVGENY PASHUKANIS, PASHUKANIS: SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW
(Piers Beirne & Robert Sharlet, trans., Peter B. Maggs ed., 1980).
30. JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 72 n. 12 (2003).
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analytic accounts, on the other hand, have concentrated on what
rights an individual may have in the face of specific instances of
conduct deemed coercive to best complete the formula: X coerces Y
into doing or not doing A if and only if . . .. None of these accounts
have taken as their subject whether the law has evolved a coherent
understanding of economic coercion, or even coercion itself, across
substantive areas of adjudication, nor have they adequately
accounted for the historical context informing such adjudications. 31
1. Coercion and Public Law
John Austin's "command theory" of law-identifying the law
with its coercive power to back its commands with force-dominated
philosophical theories of law in the Anglo-American tradition until
the mid-twentieth century. 32 Beginning in the 1950s, his exclusive
definition of legal duties and obligations in terms of state-sanctioned
threats came under attack in favor of legal positivist accounts of law:
"[l]t is because a rule is regarded as obligatory that a measure of
coercion may be attached to it: it is not obligatory because there is
coercion." 33 John Rawls was an exception by not radically departing
31. David Zimmerman interjected his analysis of economic coercion in the
context of wage offers, but his "amoral" account took no notice of juridical
adjudications of economic coercion claims. See Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers,
supra note 10, at 122. See also Lawrence A. Alexander, Zimmerman on Coercive
Wage Offers, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 12, no. 2, 160-64 (1983); David Zimmerman, More on
Coercive Wage Offers: A Reply to Alexander, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 12, no. 2, 165-71
(1983). It is important to point out here that modern and contemporary economic
theory, particularly in the context of labor markets, have proposed models for how to
think about economic coercion, but "[d]espite the historical importance of coercion,
the literature on coercive labor markets is limited." Daron Acemoglu & Alexander
Wolitzky, The Economics of Labor Coercion, 79 ECONOMETRICA 555, 559 (2011)..Even
those accounts, however, posit a narrow definition of coercion for the purposes of
modeling incentives and efficiencies that may result from its use absent external
regulation. See id. at 555-60, 570.
32. See Frederick Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, 120 YALE L.J. 586, 589-90
(2010). See generally JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE
PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 311-20, 357-64 (R. Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885
[1861]); JOHN AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 11, at 21-25.
33. A.L. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 17 (1953). In addition
to Hart's objections discussed herein, see Joseph Raz, "The Claims of Law," in THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 28, 29-31 (1979); JOSEPH RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS
[Vol. 83.10711082
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from Austin's view,34 but Rawls concentrated on the legitimation of
political power and stated that
our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of
which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals
acceptable to their common human reason.35
H.L.A Hart's 1961 Concept of Law advanced a legal positivist
rejection of "command theory" in favor of an empirical, Weberian
view of law's authority as fundamentally social (the "social fact"
thesis).36 For Hart, law rested on custom, with a bifurcated system of
primary and secondary rules: the primary rules govern conduct, and
the secondary rules allow the creation, modification, or rejection of
primary rules. 37 Hart's "rule of recognition" was a key secondary rule
that differentiaited norms recognized as having the authority of law
from social rules that lacked this recognition and lacked the force of
law.38 He rejected the command theory's failure to explain the
internal aspect, the "critical reflective attitude," of following rules
and stated, "[I]f a system of rules is to be imposed by force on any,
there must be a sufficient number who accept it voluntarily. Without
their voluntary cooperation, thus creating authority, the coercive
power of law and government cannot be established."39 In his 1964
The Morality of Law, Lon Fuller also rejected Austin's "command
theory" in favor of viewing law as "the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules."40 Fuller explicitly
139 (1975); Hans Oberdiek, The Role of Sanctions and Coercion in Understanding
Law and Legal Systems, 21 AM. J. JURIs. 71 (1976).
34. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 136 (1996 [1993]).
35. Id. at 137.
36. See generally HART, supra note 11, at 20-25, 79-99, 249-50.
37. See generally id.
38. Id. at 94-110, 246-268, 292-95. In this notion, Hart was influenced by
Kelsen's idea of the "Grundnorm," or "basic norm," which forms the underlying basis
for a legal system that is accepted by a minimum number of people in a community
as authoritative, as the "ought" element of established normative relations. See
KELSEN, supra note 11, at 73-77.
39. HART, supra note 11, at 27-33, 48, 88-91, 196. See also H.LA. HART, LAW,
LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963); EDWIN W. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND
IDEAS OF THE LAW 123 (1953).
40. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 106 (2d ed. 1969 [1964]).
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rejected "treating the use or potential use of force as the identifying
characteristic of law," viewing such identification as a "fatal
abstraction" "from the purposive activity necessary to create and
maintain a system of legal rules."4 1 Ronald Dworkin's legal
interpretivism dealt another blow. Dworkin rejected both Austin's
"command theory" and Hart's legal positivism, arguing that
"jurisprudential issues are at their core issues of moral principle, not
legal fact or strategy."42 Dworkin decoupled the government's power
to coerce from legality, viewing law as a constraint informed by
moral principles that justify the enforcement of rights and
obligations.4 3 Norms and institutional history do not constitute law
but act as an "ingredient" of judicial decision-making "because
institutional history is part of the background that any plausible
judgment about the rights of an individual must accommodate," but
"[p]olitical rights are creatures of both history and morality."44
2. Coercion and Private Law
Like Dworkin, Robert Nozick viewed the morality of individual
rights as a constraint on the coercive power of government,4 5 and in
1969, he developed a new framework for evaluating coercion at the
micro-level, between an individual coercer and coercee. 46 Nozick
argued that there were six necessary and sufficient conditions for
the proposition "P coerces Q" to be true:
1) P aims to keep Q from choosing to perform action A;
2) P communicates a claim to Q;
3) P's claim indicates that if Q performs A, then P will bring
about some consequence that would make Q's A-ing less
desirable to Q than Q's not A-ing;
4) P's claim is credible to Q;
5) Q does not do A;
41. Id. at 108, 110, 115.
42. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 7 (1977).
43. See RONALD DWORK IN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 5-6 (2011); RONALD
DWOREIN, LAWS EMPIRE 119-20 (1986).
44. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 42, at 87.
45. See H.L.A Hart, Between Utility and Rights, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 86 (A. Ryan ed., 1979).
46. Nozick, supra note 11, at 441-45.
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6) Part of Q's reason for not doing A is to lessen the
likelihood that P will bring about the consequence
announced in (3).47
For Nozick, coercion was explicitly dependent on the coercee's
decision to take or not take an action based on a morally-neutral
baseline and required successful prevention of performance of that
action (a "success condition").48 It also required reference to facts of
the coercee's psychology, such as how the coercee was internally
affected by the coercion, rather than the coercer's means or the
conditions required for the coercer's success.49 Finally, Nozick
identified coercion exclusively with threats that involved only
indirect uses of force.50 Forceful or violent conduct, background
conditions, or the mere existence of asymmetrical power
relationships did not fit within the coercive model. In fact, in
Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick argued that "circumstances" that
limit alternatives are not coercive, that only specific interpersonal
threats can be coercive.5' His account was a dramatic narrowing of
the concept of coercion from prior accounts where the element of
direct force was a necessary condition for coercion. 52
Nozick's essay triggered a flurry of articles, the "Coercion
Debates," focusing on coercion through the 1970s and 1980s. 5 3 Most
47. Id.
48. Nozick, supra note 11, at 441-45.
49. See Scott Anderson, How Did There Come to be Two Kinds of Coercion?, in
COERCION AND THE STATE 17-30 (David Reidy & Walter Riker, eds., 2008).
50. Nozick, supra note 11, at 458-65.
51. See Nagel, Foreword to NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 2, at 262-62. See also
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPIiCAL EXPLANATIONS 49 (1981).
52. See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 11, at 34.
53. See Anderson, supra note 19, at Sec. 2.1, "Nozick and a New Approach to
Coercion." See also in chronological order as the Debates unfolded: NOMos XIV:
COERCION (Roland J. Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1972); Harry Frankfurt,
Coercion and Moral Responsibility, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT
(1988 [1973]); Nagel, Foreword to NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 2; Michael D. Bayle,
Coercive Offers and Public Benefits, in 55 THE PERSONALIST 139 (1974); Daniel
Lyons, Welcome Threats and Coercive Offers, 50 PHIL. 425 (1975); Oberdiek, supra
note 33; Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals, 4 POL. THEORY 65 (1976); Theodore
Benditt, Threats and Offers, in 58 THE PERSONALIST 382 (1979); Martin Gunderson,
Threats and Coercion, 9 CAN. J. OF PHIL. 247 (1979); H.J. McCloskey, Coercion: Its
Nature and Significance, 18 S. J. OF PIHL. 335 (1980); Cheyney C. Ryan, The
Normative Concept of Coercion, 89 MIND 481 (1980); Zimmerman, Coercive Wage
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explicitly or implicitly adopted Nozick's framework but were divided
on whether empirical or moralized theories best explained coercion,
concentrating on three sets of issues: how narrowly or broadly the
baseline situation should be viewed, whether a morally-neutral
baseline was possible, and whether baseline accounts were useful at
all for theorizing coercion.54 Under the empirical view, coercion
claims were understood to be value-free and resolvable without
resorting to moral principles. Determining whether conduct was
coercive depended only on an analysis of facts: whether the coercee
would be better or worse off by accepting the coercer's proposal,
whether the coercee was psychologically pressured, whether
"reasonable alternatives" existed, and whether reasonable persons
would accept or reject a given proposal.55 Moralized theories of
coercion, on the other hand, contended that any coercion
determination required assessment of core moral issues: whether a
coercer had the right to make his proposal, whether the coercee
ought to resist the proposal, and whether the coercee should be
entitled to recover if she succumbs to the proposal.5 6 For moral
theorists, the coercive encounter could not be so designated without
"principles," or "standard[s] . . . , not because [they] will advance or
secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable,
but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other
dimension of morality." 57
Offers, supra note 10; Mark Fowler, Coercion and Practical Reason, 8 Soc. THEORY
AND PRAC. 329 (1982); Michael Gorr, Toward a Theory of Coercion, 16 CAN. J. OF
PHIL. 383 (1986).
54. WERTHEIMER, supra note 45, at 7; Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, supra
note 10, at 126. See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1448 n.142 (1989) ("Virtually all philosophical commentators
writing in Nozick's wake agree with the basic premise of his article: that coercive
proposals ('threats,' in Nozick's terminology), unlike noncoercive proposals ('offers,' in
Nozick's terminology), involve a departure from some baseline of 'the normal or
natural or expected course of events' that makes the recipient worse off. . . . They
disagree, however, about how to define the appropriate baseline. The debated
baselines fall roughly into two categories: descriptive and moral.") Id. (citations
omitted).
55. WERTHEIMER, supra note 45, at 7. See also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF
219 (1986); Frankfurt, supra note 53, at 26-46.
56. Id.
57. DWOREIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 42, at 23. See also
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 54, at 1428 ("[Alny useful
conception of coercion is irreducibly normative. Without a theory of autonomy,
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David Zimmerman was the sole participant in the Coercion
Debates who discussed economic coercion.58 His analysis focuses on
wage offers and is firmly positioned within the dominant
frameworks of the Debates. He explicitly situates himself on the
empirical side of the empirical-moralist divide, assumes the baseline
approach as the best heuristic for distinguishing coercion from non-
coercion, concentrates exclusively on offers over conduct, and relies
on common sense intuitions over other sources of knowledge
(history, economics, sociology, etc.) to ground his baseline-shifting
definition.5 9 Rejecting Nozick's assumption of a morally-neutral
baseline,6 0 he argues that offers are only coercive if the coercee
"would prefer to move from the normally expected pre-proposal
situation to the proposal situation but he would strongly prefer even
more to move from the actual pre-proposal situation to some
alternative pre-proposal situation."61 Thus, for the coercer's offer to
be genuinely coercive, "it must be the case that [the coercer] actively
prevents [the coercee] from being in the alternative pre-proposal
situation [the coercee] strongly prefers."62 Zimmerman limits the
range of alternative pre-proposal situations by imposing a
"feasibility condition" requiring those alternatives be "historically,
economically, [and] technologically" possible. 63 He then contends
that "[w]hether capitalist wage offers are coercive or not depends on
whether an alternative pre-proposal situation is feasible which is
sufficiently better than the terms of the actual wage offer and which
capitalists prevent workers from having." 64
utility, fairness, or desert, one cannot tell when choice has been wrongfully
constrained."). Id. at 1443 ("[Coercion] necessarily embodies a conclusion about the
wrongfulness of a proposal, not merely the degree of constraint it imposes on
choice.').
58. See generally Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, supra note 10.
59. Id. at 123 ("I argue . . . that coercion is not an essentially moral
concept. . . ."); 123-24 ("the phenomenon of 'coercive offers' can be accommodated
without any assumptions about prior rights and wrongs."); 131 ("In developing a
completely non-moral account of coercion, the main task is to accommodate
intuitions about the coerciveness of proposals ....
60. Id. at 126.
61. Id. at 132.
62. Id. at 133.
63. Id. at 132.
64. Id. at 140.
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While it does not focus on economic coercion per se, Alan
Wertheimer's seminal 1987 work, Coercion, is the first and only
development of a theory of coercion on the basis of what "underlies
judicial decisions across [a] full range" of substantive legal contexts,
such as contracts, torts, family law, trusts and estates, free speech
and criminal law.65 Wertheimer aligns himself with moral (as
opposed to empirical) accounts of coercion and accepts Nozick and
others' view that coercion is limited to specific instances of coercive
threats.66 After reviewing a selection of cases, Wertheimer extracts a
two-pronged test for determining such a threat: "A coerces B to do X
if and only if (1) A's proposal creates a choice situation for B such
that B has no reasonable alternative but to do X and (2) it is wrong
for A to make such a proposal to B."67 Wertheimer refers to the first
condition as the "choice prong" and the second as the "proposal
prong." 68 He argues that, because the law fundamentally relies on
whether it is wrong for A to make certain proposals to B, "the law
adopts a moralized or normative approach to coercion."69 Coercion
claims are thus contextual, lacking a single set of required truth
conditions for their validity. 70 Wertheimer adopts a baseline
approach, but his baseline-setting is modified to the extent that
choosing which alternatives, if any, are available once a proposal is
made is entirely dependent on normative judgments: "the required
baseline will be determined by the moral force the coercion claim is
meant to support.... I do not see any general theoretical motivation
for saying that there is or must be a unique and proper way for
setting B's baseline."71 But Wertheimer does ground the moral
baseline on a theory of rights: "the structure of coercion discourse
presupposes that A and B have certain obligations and rights which
establish a background against which A's proposals are
understood." 72 Wertheimer identifies the moral baseline with rights
that he claims that "[a] theory which denied that B has any rights
would . . . also have to deny any fundamental moral importance to
65. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 45, at xii, 15, 19-178.
66. Id. at 6, 173, 184, 212.
67. Id. at 172 (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 172-73.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 184-88.
71. Id. at 201-12.
72. Id. at 217.
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coercion." 73 Rights are critical for Wertheimer's account because his
exclusive focus is on which coercion claims generate "responsibility-
affecting contexts."74
C. Limitations of Philosophical Accounts
The philosophical literature provides an essential background for
elaborating a broader theory of economic coercion. After first
detailing limitations of these accounts for such a theory, this Section
will extrapolate a set of key requirements that they suggest for
laying that theory's groundwork.
1. Philosophical Accounts of Public Law and A Theory of
Economic Coercion
While focusing on whether law can be saved from a reductionist
description as coercive command, recent philosophical thought on
coercion has concentrated on answering public law questions. It
either ignored or has been ill-equipped to offer a full account of
economic coercion. First, discussions focused exclusively on public
law cannot alone account for all economic transactions and
relationships that are coercive, and, further, are either indifferent to
or explicitly not concerned with coercive economic relations within
the administration of a system of law or justice. For example, Rawls'
account of the maximum equal liberty principle as "defin[ing] the
end of social justice" is compatible with "[t]he inability to take
advantage of one's rights and opportunities as a result of poverty
and ignorance, and a lack of means generally," because, in his view,
poverty does not put a constraint on one's liberty, but only reduces
the "worth of liberty."75 Other principles of justice valuing
arrangements of economic inequalities to everyone's best advantage
concern fairness rather than liberty constraints. This invites the
larger question: how satisfying are accounts of freedom and coercion
that do not provide mechanisms for evaluating whether economic
73. Id. at 218.
74. Id. at 6, 307.
75. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 179. See also Norman Daniels, "Equal Liberty
and Unequal Worth of Liberty," in READING RAWLS 253-81 (Norman Daniels ed.
1976); WERTHEIMER, supra note 45, at 5.
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inequality can restrict freedoms and create coercive relationships,
independently of whether or not that inequality is just?
Second, while legal positivist and legal interpretivist accounts
detach the law from an exclusively coercive function, their
approaches are insufficient to account for economic facts and
relationships that generate duties and norms that have coercive
force or impose liberty constraints relevant for determining what the
law is or should be. Rules of recognition and moral principles may
inform how individuals and judges evaluate economic relationships
as coercive, but they do not explain how economic coercion itself can
be determinative of the law, or individual and collective rights. Nor
can they provide an adequate account of what substantively informs,
from a historical perspective, the core components of an economic
coercion claim: what the breadth and scope of the economic field is
conceived to be, how economic actors are understood to impact each
other or the economy, and what theories of economic rights or duties
inform understandings of economic freedom and freedom more
broadly.
2. Philosophical Accounts of Private Law and A Theory of
Economic Coercion
Philosophical accounts of coercion in private law or at the level of
individuals has also not attended to the particularities of coercion's
operation in an economic setting. While rare accounts such as
Zimmerman's concentrate on coercion in the context of wage offers,
it raises more questions than it answers. Like other Coercion
Debates theorists, Zimmerman accepts Nozick's focus on the
coercee's subjective state as the site of coercion, ignoring the difficult
question of whether those suffering from psychological impairments
could be victims of coercion. Even if Zimmerman were to concede in
his baseline analysis that an alternative pre-proposal situation could
be generated by a "reasonable observer" rather than by the coercee's
subjective preferences, it would be impossible to determine which
alternatives are "strongly preferable" without relying on some moral
or empirical criterion of what would satisfy the reasonable observer's
(hitherto unexamined) conception of a less coercive alternative
situation. Further, his account fails to elaborate what the conditions
of imposing the reasonable observer's preferred alternatives on the
coercee would be and what the criteria would be for determining
whether an alternative situation is or is not historically possible.
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Even if Zimmerman were to justify some form of benign paternalism,
accepting the role of a reasonable observer at all would challenge the
very premise of the baseline framework he, Nozick and others apply
to assess coercion. It would reveal its fundamental arbitrariness:
how do we ever know where to draw the baseline? How far ought we
go back from the proposal or pre-proposal situation to ascertain
when someone was "free" of coercion and/or what created the
proposal situation in the first place? How many alternative
situations ought one consider, and what primary rules or
background values ought to be used to choose one baseline over
another? In the realm of wage offers, there may be a more empirical
basis for determining whether one wage is "sufficiently better" than
others, but even wage offers are not as simple as they seem.
Zimmerman assumes wage offers are a one-to-one transaction
exchanging labor for money, but valuing wages itself depends on a
number of factors outside the immediate coercion situation: how we
value labor, how we define the labor market, the worker's own
valuation of his or her work over time, and so on.
While Wertheimer's approach incorporates a broader context into
its assessment of coercion claims, it has a number of limitations.
First, the "context" he deems determinative of coercion claims is very
narrow. Wertheimer provides no justification for why the relevant
"context" ought be limited to normative judgments rather than
material conditions. Further, Wertheimer abstracts a theory of
coercion from judicial decisions assuming that their historical, socio-
economic context in no way impacts how coercion claims are
interpreted or decided.76 And in his review of substantive law,
Wertheimer ignores areas critical to understanding economic
coercion claims: labor law, human rights law, and trade law, to name
a few.
Second, Wertheimer fails to justify his assumption that rights
are dispositive of coercion claims, and that without rights, there
would be no "fundamental moral importance" to coercion claims.7 7 If
rights just are normative judgments for Wertheimer, then the claim
that coercion, which is dependent on normative judgments, is
unimportant outside a rights-based system is circular. Additionally,
76. Id. at xii ("Unashamedly, I move from state to federal law and back again,
from lower appellate courts to the highest court in the land, and back and forth in
time.').
77. See id. at 217-18.
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coercion claim adjudication can itself be rights-creating where no
prior right was recognized. In fact, coercion claims are often used to
test whether a right ought to exist where no right was previously
recognized, and if so, its scope. It cannot be the case that the
existence of the right is itself what generates the moral importance
of the coercion claim. Moreover, Wertheimer's duty-based account
cannot account for systemic coercion claims.78
Finally, to the extent Wertheimer discusses economic coercion,
he assumes, without justification, that moral determinations exist
independently of economic theory or analysis. For example,
discussing the economic compulsion to accept a job and specific
compulsions generated from fear of being fired, Wertheimer argues
that neither
rest on an unrealistic economic theory, or, indeed, on any
(empirical) economic theory. To defend [a] distinction
[between them], . . . [o]ne need only claim that employers
have legal or moral responsibilities to their employees that
differ from their responsibilities to others. This is a moral
view, not an economic theory .... it need not presuppose any
particular view about economic mobility and labor supply.79
Wertheimer here puts the cart before the horse. He assumes that it
is the existence of a legal or moral duty that determines whether or
not coercion exists, but the very existence of the duty stems from a
common law or statutory institutionalization of responsibilities after
deciding that certain economic relationships as opposed to others
require state regulation. Views of "economic mobility" and "labor
supply" are inseparable from and often determinative of the
boundaries of the marketplace and where lines of duty should be
drawn between actors in that marketplace. Without a theory and
analysis of how economic conditions are understood, the imposition
of a duty between, for example, a franchise employer and a franchise
employee as opposed to a multinational corporate employer and a
franchise employee, is wholly arbitrary.
78. Wertheimer recognizes this, but does not reject the possibility of systemic
exploitation: "I ignore systemic or technical accounts of exploitation, although I do
not want to deny that some such account is possible." Id. at 226 n. 20.
79. Id. at 59.
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3. Extrapolating Minimum Requirements For A Theory of
Economic Coercion
Despite its limitations in elaborating a theory of economic
coercion, we can extract a number of core, foundational requirements
for such a theory. First, for a theory of economic coercion to match
the robust public law accounts of coercion, it must account for the
effects of the exercise of state power on individual autonomy, both as
it applies to individual conduct and to individual virtue. It must also
explain the mechanism through which the economic coercive power
of the state may or may not serve as a justification for sovereignty,
the social utility of law, and the enforcement of a network of
economic rights. Further, it must account for the positivist and
interpretivist dimension of the law that serves as a condition for the
state's economic coercive power, linking the purposive activity of
constructing or refusing to construct real legal protections for the
liberty interests implicated by economic coercion.
However, in being able to encompass the private law dimensions
of economic coercion, an exhaustive theory must recognize
horizontal- and market-based relationships that restrain economic
liberties, touching on direct and indirect uses of force. In doing so, it
must accommodate both the empirical and moral dimensions of
economic coercion. In accommodating the moral dimension of
economic coercion claims, it must be attentive to the formative role:
of history, normative values, and institutions in identifying and
incorporating constraints on economic coercive power. Given the
complex determinants of economic relationships and their
intersection with state-granted rights and socio-political values, a
proper account of economic coercion must expand out from the
baseline of the "proposal" or "choice situation" into the broader
historical, economic, and ideational context. It must be informed by
the regulatory context at play, not only within the narrow context
that makes coercive offers or conduct colorable under a particular
area of substantive law, but also within a broader, background
understanding of what makes economic coercion actionable across
substantive areas of law. The nature and legal status of economic
coercion has neither been sufficiently explored nor evaluated as a
legal category across substantive areas of law. Except in the context
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of labor law,80 scholarship has almost exclusively explored it as a
theoretical rather than historical concept in the individual
substantive areas of taxation,8 1 international sanctions, 82 and
contracts. 83 A full theorization of the value of economic coercion as a
regulating concept requires taking an overarching view of how the
law has historically credited, justified, or rejected claims of economic
coercion and whether it has evolved a coherent view of how to
adjudicate such claims in the broad array of contexts in which they
are adjudicated.
Finally, a proper theory of economic coercion must begin by
assessing the position of the coercer in addition to the coercee. 84 It is
80. See, e.g., ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2001); Michael C. Harper, A Framework for the
Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement, 76 IND. L.J. 103 (2001).
81. See, e.g., AGUSTiN JOSE MENANDEZ, JUSTIFYING TAXES: SOME ELEMENTS
FOR A GENERAL THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC TAX LAW (2001); JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS (1994); RAZ,
MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 33, at 45; Michael Blake, Distributive Justice,
State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 257, 276-78
(2001).
82. See BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING
THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME (1988); DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION:
SANCTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen, eds., 1983);
VALENTIN L. KRUSTEv, BARGAINING AND ECONOMIC COERCION: THE USE AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS (2008); Derek W. Bowett, Economic Coercion and
Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1972); Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm
Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2001); Daniel W.
Drezner, The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion, 57 INT'L ORG. 643 (2003); Tom J.
Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79
A.J.I.L. 405 (1985); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic
Sanctions: The Expansion of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U. L.
REV. 323 (1981); Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly,
28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901 (1995).
83. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEx. L. REV. 717
(2005). See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979);
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Wertheimer, supra note 45, at 19-53;
P.S. Atiyah, Economic Duress and the "Overborne Will", 98 L.Q. REV. 197 (1982);
Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY
45 (2002); John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L.
REV. 253 (1947); Richard Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 293 (1975); Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89
YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
84. For an early, important coercer-focused account, see Joan McGregor,
Bargaining Advantages and Coercion in the Market, 14 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
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relational and has distributive implications. It must incorporate the
normative judgments, ethical judgments, and the material
conditions into the analysis of the "choice situation." In other words,
a proper account of economic coercion must expand beyond
interpersonal proposals to consider the strength and validity of
systemic coercion claims and provide "thick descriptions" of those
claims.8 5 Additionally, it must analyze not only the end result of a
coercion claim-the "success requirement"-but also, the processes
through which economic choices are constrained even before the
constrained party is presented with a "proposal." In other words, it
must be both procedural and substantive, and must touch on both
liberty interests and welfare interests.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL AccouNTs OF COERCION
To both overcome the limitations presented by the above
philosophical accounts as well as to develop the core requirements of
a theory of economic coercion, this Section explores the development
of theories of economic coercion in the law. As recent scholars
recognize, "[d]espite continuous efforts, legal doctrine has not
succeeded in producing a coherent jurisprudence of coercion, and
legal scholarship has had little success influencing the course of the
law." 8 6 However, Legal Realist accounts of mutual coercion provide
as close a model practicable for integrating the public and private
law dimensions of economic coercion and providing an account of
ARCHIVES 23 (1988-89). See also Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 83, at 717
(focusing on the motivations of the threatening party); WILLIAM PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 391 (1941) (rejecting distinction between
circumstantial pressures and direct threats as writing into law an economic theory
"increasingly foreign to any realities").
85. 'Thick description" is a concept developed by Clifford Geertz to incorporate
context into anthropological descriptions of facts, data, or ritual-"interworked
systems of construable signs." Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an
Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED
ESSAYS 3-32 (1973). 'Thick description" was a methodological challenge to mere
"fact" description because such description "obscure[s] most of what we need to
comprehend a particular event, ritual, custom, idea, or whatever is insinuated as
background information before the thing itself is directly examined." Id. at 9. The
ethnographer's task, according to Geertz, is to describe the "multiplicity of complex
conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another,
which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit." Id. at 10.
86. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, supra note 83, at 779.
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economic coercion that illuminates its systemic dimension. By
drawing from these accounts, this Section elucidates a flexible model
for delineating such a theory.
A. Legal Realism: Understanding and Mapping Coercion
Far from limiting evaluations of economic coercion to individual
encounters, U.S. Supreme Court decisions have taken it on in the
most expansive contexts. In the early twentieth century, the Court
was tasked with regulating the rise of and access to an emerging
national economy. In a series of decisions, the Court considered the
validity of the use of state protectionist measures against
corporations seeking to expand across states. In those decisions, the
Court struck down state taxes and charter fees levied against out-of-
state corporations as unconstitutional. 87 Writing for the Court,
Justice Harlan invalidated the exactions at issue as "illegally
burdening interstate commerce and imposing a tax on property
beyond the jurisdiction of the State."88
On the basis of those decisions, Justice Holmes developed a
theory of economic "implied duress."89 In Atchison v. O'Connor, he
struck down as unconstitutional a Colorado tax levied on capital
stock of companies conducting business in the state. 90 The take-it-or-
leave-it element of the Colorado law required every corporation that
failed to pay the tax to "forfeit[] its right to do business within the
State until the tax is paid" and to "pay a penalty of ten per cent"
every six months of default.9 1 The Court found that such "payment
was made under duress" since companies would suffer "serious"
consequences in its subsequent business, and would be penalized
throughout its contestation of the tax." 9 2 Justice Holmes went
87. See Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 216 U.S. 146 (1910); Pullman
Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56 (1910); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1
(1910). The unconstitutionality of the state taxes was based on the negative
implications of the Commerce Clause as well as violative of then-prevailing doctrines
of substantive due process. For commentary, see Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, supra note 54, at 1430, n.48.
88. Ludwig, 216 U.S. at 163.
89. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918); Atchison
v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912).
90. Atchison, 223 U.S. at 285.
91. Id. at 286.
92. Id. at 286-87.
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further to lament courts' slowness, stating that courts were "a little
too slow to recognize[ing] the implied duress under which payment is
made."93
In a subsequent decision, Union Pacific Railroad v. Public
Service Commission of Missouri, Justice Holmes further developed
the concept of "implied duress."94 There, the Missouri Public Service
Commission ("PSC") charged an out-of-state railroad company a
substantial fee when it applied for a certificate authorizing the issue
of bonds secured by a mortgage on the company's entire line.9 5
Missouri law had prohibited bond issuance without PSC authority,
imposed severe penalties for such issue, and would make bonds
unmarketable if certification were refused.9 6 Plaintiff Union Pacific
Railroad had applied for certification in all States its line passed
through, and when forced to pay a large fee to the PSC, paid but
challenged the charge as unconstitutional.9 7 After the Missouri
Supreme Court upheld the charge, the railroad appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court.98 Justice Holmes easily found the charge
unconstitutional, challenging the Missouri Supreme Court's
reasoning. 99 That court, Justice Holmes stated, avoided the issue of
unconstitutional conditions "by holding that the application to the
Commission was voluntary."10 0 Justice Holmes, however, insisted
that the availability of choice did not invalidate the duress: 'It
always is for the interest of the party under duress to choose the
lesser of two evils. But the fact that a choice was made according to
interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of duress
properly so called."10 1
Thus, in the context of unconstitutional conditions, Justice
Holmes outlined the courts' duty to investigate underlying or
"implied" mechanisms by which larger, collective actors like the
State exert economic force on corporations even when those
corporations have choices facially available. He drew from legal
defenses circumscribed for use in contract law to regulate access to
93. Id. at 286.
94. 248 U.S. 67.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 68.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 69.
99. Id. at 69-70.
100. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 70.
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the national economy. This "scaling up" of contract principles
implicitly assumes that economic forces at work in singular
transactions subject to contract law are comparable to those
operating at the level of the national economy. 102
Justice Holmes' refusal to view "choice" as a decontextualized,
fixed concept rather than as determined by context was an early
invitation to investigate the meaning of legal terms through factual
analysis: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience."1 03 In that same decade, scholars of the Legal Realist
school began the arduous task of testing the function of legal
concepts in context, and by 1935, Felix Cohen marked Legal
Realism's victories against the "transcendental nonsense" of
nineteenth century formalist and idealist jurisprudence:
Llewellyn has filed an involuntary petition in bankruptcy
against the concept Title, Oliphant against the concept
Contract, Haines, Brown, T. R. Powell, Finkelstein, and
Cushman against Due Process, Police Power, and similar
charm-words of constitutional law, Hale, Richberg,
Bonbright, and others against the concept of Fair Value in
rate regulation, Cook and Yntema against the concept of
Vested Rights in conflict of laws. Each of these men has tried
to expose the confusions of current legal thinking engendered
by these concepts and to reformulate the problems in his
field in terms which show the concrete relevance of legal
decisions to social facts.104
102. This is striking in light of Holmes' earlier dissent in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), where he excoriated the Court for deciding the constitutionality
of a New York law setting maximum working hours for bakers based on "an economic
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.... [A] constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
103. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881). See generally
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 3 (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz, & Thomas
A. Reed, eds., 1993); NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 33-48
(1995); BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT
HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 15 (2001); GRANT GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA,
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 9, 171-72 (1997).
104. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 823 (1935) (internal citations omitted).
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For Llewellyn, Oliphant, Hale, and the rest of the Legal Realists,
nothing less than the thorough realization of core freedoms-"equal
opportunity" and "preserving the equal rights of others"-was at
stake in unraveling the jurisprudential sophistries in which
American law was thought to be entangled. 0 5
For Robert Hale, one of the most critical legal concepts to
unravel was coercion. Through a series of articles culminating in his
1952 Freedom Through Law, Hale developed a theory of mutual
coercion to reveal how the "constitutionally protected sphere of
economic life . . . was constituted by a regime of property and
contract rights that were neither spontaneously occurring nor self-
defining, but were rather the positive creation of the state." 0 6 Hale
distinguished between two conceptions of freedom: voluntary
freedom, or a form of complete autonomy with no limitations on
choice or behavior, and volitional freedom, the choice between
available alternatives in a world limited by circumstances created by
others. 0 7 Hale's theory of coercion posited that social actors had
mutual coercive capacity limited only by the total coercive capacity
of others. 08 Coercion was the impact of the behavior of others, as
individuals or in the aggregate, that transformed voluntary to
105. Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38.3 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923). See also Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism
Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 469 (1988).
106. FRIED, supra note 103, at 2-3. See generally the following Robert Hale
publications: FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING
POWER (1952); LEGAL FACTORS IN ECONOMIC SOCIETY (1st ed. 1935, 2 vols.; 2d ed.
1937, 3 vols.; 3d ed. 1940, 2 vols.; 4th ed. 1946; 5th ed. 1947); Bargaining, Duress and
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. (1943); Coercion and Distribution, supra note
105; Economics and Law, in THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THEIR INTERRELATION (W.F.
Oghurn & A. Goldenweiser, eds., 1927); Force and the State: A Comparison of
"Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. (1935); Labor Legislation
as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, 15 AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 155 (1925); Law
Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 451 (1920); Rate Making and the
Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (1922); Some Phases of the
Minimum Wage: Discussion, 7 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1917).
107. Hale, Law Making, supra note 106, at 455. See also LEGAL FACTORS, supra
note 106, at 594.
108. See Warren Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and Its Legal
Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 279 (1973).
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volitional freedom. 109 For Hale, coercion did not involve moral
judgment, but rather social facts determinative of the impact or
control of one individual or set of actors on others' choices. 110 Thus,
all volitional freedom, or benefits accrued in society, were
"subsidized by very appreciable sacrifices imposed on other
people,"' part of an "interplay of coercive capacities through
'compulsions and counter-compulsions' of relative withholding power
and the reciprocal imposition of conditions."11 2 Power for Hale was
the ability to alter one's legal relations or position to one's
advantage. 113
Rather than isolating the coercive encounter to individualized
acts, Hale expanded the context of coercion to the entire economy
and to the sphere of public government as creating the legal bases
for a system of mutual coercion: a "ubiquity of externalities."1 4 Hale
originated the concept of "private government" to explain how the
acquisition and exercise of private rights in a market economy
governed resource allocation and income distribution. He understood
"governance" broadly-finding government "[w]herever we find some
men compelling other men to obey them"-and concentrated on "the
all-pervading role of privately instituted government in the economic
sphere." 15 Private government was indistinguishable from public
government to the extent that it had the same constraining effect on
volitional freedom.n6 The power that pervaded private government
109. Robert Hale, Robert Lee Hale Papers, 1912-1958, Rare Book & Manuscript
Library, Columbia University, Folders 39-26 at 2 & 585 at 6 & 69-1 (quoted in
Samuels, Economy, supra note 106, at 288-289). See also Samuels, supra note 108,
at 277.
110. Hale, Law Making, supra note 106, at 476.
111. Hale Papers, supra note 109, Folders 93-1 at 5-6 (quoted in Samuels,
Economy, supra note 108, at 287).
112. Samuels, Economy, supra note 108, at 291 (quoting Hale Papers, supra note
109, Folder 93-1 at 29).
113. Id. at 274-75.
114. Id. at 286.
115. Hale Papers, supra note 109, Folder 79-1 at 2 & 93-1 at 33 (quoted in
Samuels, Economy, supra note 108, at 296).
116. Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 105, at 471; Hale, Law Making,
supra note 106, at 453; Hale, LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 106, at 555. In this, Hale
echoes Brandeis' dissent in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 368 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), where he argued that the employer used the Sherman Act to prevent
worker boycotts "to endow [their] property with active militant power, which would
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operated through the economy as "a network of coercive pressures
and counter-pressures of varying strength, each pressure
consisting .. . either of the power to lock or to unlock the bars which
the law erects against the non-owners of each piece of property, or
else of the power to withhold or not to withhold labor."1 17 One's
bargaining power was reduced to a form of private tax showing the
payment one was willing to make to overcome the economic pressure
exercised by another's ability to withhold payment in any given
transaction. 118 Thus, power was constituted through control over
private property rights, and because there was unequal property
rights distribution, there was an asymmetry in the exercise of
mutual coercion, resulting in the embodiment of economic
inequalities "in unequal legal rights."1 19 For that reason, "[t]here is
no equality before the law, there never has been, and it is difficult to
conceive how there could be." 12 0
Private government alone did not solidify power asymmetries.
Economic processes for Hale were inseparable from legal processes.
Hale viewed the structure and outcomes of mutual coercion as a
product of government action where the government "controll[ed] the
exercise of conflicting economic liberties through upholding or
restricting the use of economic pressures," and he sought to
investigate "the effect of actual or possible legal arrangements on the
various interests . . . ."121 For Hale,
Whatever policies the law pursues in deciding how land shall
originally pass into private ownership . . . will have a
determining effect on the future course of private
make it dominant over men. In other words, that under the guise of protecting
property rights, the employer was seeking sovereign power."
117. Hale, Economics and Law, supra note 106, at 138; Hale Papers, supra note
109, Folder 93-1 at 28 & 59-1 at 3 (quoted in Samuels, Economy, supra note 108, at
305).
118. See HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 106, at 8-9, 17-19, 30-31,
129-31; Hale, Rate Making, supra note 106, at 214.
119. See Hale, Rate Making, supra note 106, at 212, 214; Hale, Coercion and
Distribution, supra note 105, at 488; HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note
106, at 12. See generally Hale, Labor Legislation, supra note 106.
120. Hale, Labor Legislation, supra note 106, at 157.
121. Hale, Economics and Law, supra note 106, at 131. See also Thomas Irwin
Emerson, Book Review: Robert L. Hale, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW (1952), 13 LAW.
GUILD REV. 139, 139 (1953).
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bargaining.. . . In enforcing contract and property rights the
state is restricting the liberty of those who have incurred
contractual obligations and of nonowners. . . It is just as
much governmental action when the conditions are
formulated by a private owner, to whom the state, in the
routine enforcement of property rights, has delegated the
power to formulate them.122
The classic example Hale cited for the principle that government
was always structuring economic liberties by favoring one party over
another was the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Schoene.123 In
Shoene, the Court considered whether a Virginia law allowing the
destruction of cedar trees afflicted with disease violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where the disease did
not harm plaintiffs cedar trees but did destroy the fruit of apple
orchards that the defendant, a state entomologist, sought to
preserve. 124 Justice Stone held that Virginia "did not exceed its
constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class
of property in order to save another" since
the state was under the necessity of making a choice between
the preservation of one class of property and that of the other
wherever both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have
been none the less of a choice if, instead of enacting the
present statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted
serious injury to the apple orchards within its borders to go
unchecked. 12 5
For Hale, making such choices was ubiquitous. 126 The Court's
reasoning was "equally applicable to the protection of one form of
individual liberty against destruction at the hands of persons
exercising a conflicting liberty." 127
122. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 106, at 380.
123. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 279-80.
126. Hale Papers, supra note 109, Folder 93-5 at 7 (quoted in Samuels,
Economy, supra note 108, at 353-54). See also id. 83-1 at 1 & 80-4 at 22-23; Hale,
Force and the State, supra note 106, at 200-01.
127. Id.
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The central questions became, given that any state action
intervenes in social relations pervaded by coercion, who was allowed
to choose, and what choices ought be made? 128 Hale condemned
laissez-faire economic theory and anarchism equally in that the
former neglected "the effects of artificial (meaning artifactual)
coercive restraints partly grounded in government itself,"1 29 and the
latter neglected liberty constraints that came from concentrations of
private power. 30 Hale found liberatory potential in a kind of
Viconian self-reflexivity: since law and economics "were not given,
but were rather what man, through his multifarious institutions of
choice, had made them,"131 they could be evaluated and changed
through alternative choices. For Hale, those changes would ideally
result in a structural rearrangement of legal rights, which would
restructure the balance of volitional freedom, to create a net
enlargement of liberties:
[I]t is a fallacy to assume that every attempt by the state to
control and to revise the economic results of bargaining
involves a net curtailment of individual liberty. It may or
may not do so. If the liberty of those whom it restrains is less
vital than the liberty which those persons would themselves
restrain, then state intervention may spell a net gain in
individual liberty.1 32
Hale did not specify what he meant by "vital," but his democratic
vision was one in which the economy and the state as a social system
was responsive to collective needs: "[t]he equality which we value
demands that our government and its laws serve the interests of all
classes of persons, rather than subordinating the liberties of some to
128. Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 105, at 1; Hale, Force and the
State, supra note 106, at 199.
129. Samuels, Economy, supra note 108, at 326 (citing Hale Papers, supra note
109, Folder 39-26 at 2 & 90-4 at 1-2).
130. See, e.g., Hale, Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 179 (1923)
('Perfect freedom from restraint by the official government is attainable only under
anarchy; and under anarchy, we might be even less free than now from restraint
imposed by non-governmental groups and individuals.").
131. Samuels, Economy, supra note 108, at 351.
132. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 106, at 4. See also Hale, Force
and the State, supra note 106, at 200.
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the interests of others."8s This would not amount to more
government interference but rather to "a change in the form of our
present incidence of paternalism." 134 Primarily, Hale viewed the
necessary modifications as occurring within the system of private
property allocation, allowing individuals to "more equally" bear the
work and share the fruits of that work. 135
B. Limitations of the Legal Realist Paradigm
The Legal Realists' work presents at least three significant
challenges to philosophical accounts of coercion. First, it redirects
how and where we should look for coercion. By embedding mutual
coercion in private and public institutional arrangements, it
demands an assessment not of whether conduct is coercive, but given
that it is, what degree of coercion is tolerable. Second, it presents a
profound critique of how coercion should be analyzed. It rejects a
baseline approach as, at best, insufficient, both because there is no
escape from the operations of mutual coercion and because baselines
could, at best, only trace back to an arbitrary point that would ignore
the "artifactual" accrual of power that preceded a given choice
situation. Further, the Legal Realist approach strives to understand
the entirety of judicial decision-making as independent attempts to
restructure the system of mutual coercion. Instead of looking for a
formal coherence to those decisions, it tries instead to describe and
evaluate their social results on the "net enlargement" of liberties.
Finally, it prescribes a novel remedy. By making the law itself
responsible, while also situating coercive power in choices made by
private actors, it dramatically complicates individual coercer
culpability from the private law philosophical accounts. For example,
circumstances deemed coercive under non-Legal Realist models, like
a hold-up by a robber where the victim must choose their money or
their life, become indistinguishable from circumstances in which an
employer threatens to prevent an employee's access to the job site. In
both contexts, the benefits accrued through the coercer's exercise of
volitional freedom result in constraints on the coercee. The Legal
133. Hale Papers, supra note 109, Folder 58-4 at 3 (quoted in Samuels,
Economy, supra note 108, at 362).
134. Id. at 56-2 at 4 (quoted in Samuels, Economy, supra note 108, at 362).
135. Robert Hale, Some Phases of the Minimum Wage: Discussion, 7 AM. ECON.
REV. 279, 280 (1917).
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Realist model offers a focus on what rights are at stake across the
system to level the playing field between the coercer and coercee.
Because the focus is on how a system of mutual coercion has
allocated volitional freedoms, attention is no longer on individual
culpability.
Yet, there are at least four limitations to the Legal Realist
approach as outlined by Hale. First, it restricts its view to a very
traditional understanding of legal rights, specifically, property and
contract rights, without looking to broader sets of legal rights,
norms, and practices that institutionalize power asymmetries.
Second, as Hale himself argues, the Legal Realist approach involves
no moral judgment. It gives marginal, if any, attention to the history
of ideas, the role of moral valuation, and the forces of material
conditions on thought that inform our very understanding of
"volitional freedom." It certainly fails to substantively evaluate what
kinds of liberty interests ought be favored over others. Third, and
relatedly, Hale's utilitarian focus on the net enlargement of liberties,
without some moral basis for evaluating the exercise of coercive
power itself, could justify instances of forced labor so long as, overall,
net liberties are expanded. But unless those goals-the net
enlargement of liberties (or its contemporary counterpart, Kaldor-
Hicks efficiencies)-are self-justifying, their value as rules for social
ordering must rely on external moral or political justification.
Because a robust account of economic coercion requires a broader
historical analysis of its evolution as well as a principled basis for
determining how it should be analyzed and remedied, it is not
enough to assume that such goals are self-explanatory. Rather, an
account must contend with competing social and moral values
inherent in our analysis of which liberty infringements are tolerable
and which are not. Finally, Hale's analysis does not address how
economic coercion works within the global economy, which presents
significant new challenges for contending with transnational and
international institutions of economic and political power.
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AccouNTs OF EcoNoMIC COERCION
A third model for both theorizing and granting protections
against economic coercion can be elucidated from the international
humanitarian and human rights traditions. The standards
developed within those traditions form the foundation for
conceptualizing the intersection of economic coercion and economic
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rights. The economic rights framework is the ideal framework for
conceptualizing and implementing protections from economic
coercion for a number of reasons. First, it offers a unified language
for framing economic liberties deprivations when they are committed
at the hands of public and private actors, both at the systemic level
and at the level of individual deprivations. Second, the structures
and tools of international legal institutions provide a fruitful avenue
for both protecting against economic coercion and providing a
thicker, value-based justification for the regulation of economic
coercion. Third, economic coercion occurs transnationally and within
the international sphere, and it is undoubtedly the subject of concern
beyond the sphere of domestic jurisdictions. Finally, the relational
and distributive nature of economic coercion claims can serve as a
key corrective to the "progressive realization" model of protecting
economic rights. Institutionalized primarily through the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) and its legacy documents, economic rights within the
human rights tradition have been understood as only capable of
protection "to the maximum of [the State Party's] available
resources" and through progressive realization.136 In fact, at the
domestic, transnational, and international level, regardless of
capacity and infrastructure, economic rights are being enforced and
protected all the time already in the form of economic coercion
claims, and it is just a matter of evaluating whether that
enforcement complies with human rights law. Mapping economic
coercion claims within overlapping jurisdictions and systems of
rights can serve as a basis for measuring, evaluating, and
challenging structural inequality.
Before exploring these points further, I first provide an overview
of how coercion has been understood and proscribed under
international law. 137
136. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Art. 2(1) (entered into force 3 January 1976)
[hereinafter ICESCRI.
137. This overview does not address international human rights proscriptions
against coercion in non-economic contexts. For example, the UN Convention Against
Torture (CAT) defines "torture" to include "any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as . . . intimidating or coercing him or a third person, . .. when such pain and
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity." CONVENTION AGAINST
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A. Regulating Systemic Economic Coercion by Public Actors
International humanitarian law provides a crucial case study for
conceptualizing the regulation of systemic economic coercion, and by
doing so, offers an important supplement to the philosophical and
legal accounts already discussed. Specifically, the adjudication of
economic coercion claims in the Nuremberg trials provides a
foundational model, within the international legal tradition, for
incorporating background conditions in the analysis of state
economic coercive power. It thus provides a crucial example of how
to implement the kind of structural analysis of coercion developed
within the Legal Realist tradition in an international setting.
In United States v. Krauch, et al. ("IG Farben") and United States
v. Von Weizsaecker, et al. ("Ministries Case"), Nazi German officials
were tried and convicted for, among other charges, war crimes and
crimes against humanity1 3 8 for participating in the plunder of public
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT,
39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, UN Doe. A/39/51 (1984). The Committee Against
Torture has addressed coercion in torture claims involving confinement, coerced
confessions, and non-refoulement obligations, to name a few. See, e.g., Agiza v.
Sweden, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/233/2003 (2005). Coercion prohibitions have also been
the subject of complaints before the Human Rights Committee under the
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR), primarily in
regards to: sexual assault (Herrera Sousa v. Spain, Comm. 109412002, U.N. Doc.
A/61/40, Vol. II, at 506 (H.R.C. 2006)); confessions (S.A. v. Tajikistan, Comm.
1240/2004, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C.97/D/1240/2004 (H.R.C. 2009)); Gougnina v.
Uzbekistan, Comm. 1141/2002, U.N. Doe. CCPRIC/92/D/1141/2002 (H.R.C. 2008);
Chikunova v. Uzbekistan, Comm. 1043/2002, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1043/2002
(H.R.C. 2007); Deollal v. Guyana, Comm. 912/2000, U.N. Doe. CCPRIC/82/D/912/2000
(H.R.C. 2004)); limiting voters' rights (Shchetko v. Belarus, Comm. 1009/2001, U.N.
Doc. CCPRIC/87/D/1009/2001 (H.R.C. 2006); Svetik v. Belarus, Comm. 927/2000,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/927/2000 (H.R.C. 2004)); reeducation programs for
"converting" thought (Kang v. Korea, Comm. 878/1999, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 (H.R.C. 2003)); and religious freedom (Khan v. Canada,
Comm. 1302/2004, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/87/D/1302/2004 (H.R.C. (2006) and
Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, Comm. 93112000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000
(H.R.C. 2004)). Additionally, the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 18 December 1990,
A/RES/45/158, at Art. 12(2), mentions coercion, but only with respect to migrant
workers' rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Since the narrow
focus of this Article is on economic coercion, it bypasses this area of law.
138. These were defined under the operative London Charter of the
International Military Tribunal Art as follows: "Art. 6(b). WAR CRIMES: namely,
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and private property, exploitation, and spoliation of countries under
German occupation.1 39 The charges were based on violations of the
Hague Conventions. 140 The Tribunal originally viewed the existence
of military occupation alone as insufficient to find coercion in
agreements reached by Nazi officials with private property owners:
"The mere presence of the military occupant is not the exclusive
indication of the assertion of pressure.... Where must be a causal
connection between the illegal means employed and the result
brought about by employing such intimidation."14 1 Nazi officials had
a "right of requisition" during a military occupation, but it was
"limited to 'the necessities of the army of occupation,' must not be
out of proportion to the resources of the country, and may not be of
such a nature as to involve the inhabitants in the obligation to take
part in military operations against their country." 142 Military
occupiers could not appropriate private property "against the will
and without the consent of the owner," but agreements in which
"there is no coercion present" would not constitute a "violation of the
Hague Regulations." 143
Yet, in IG Farben, the Tribunal shifted its view, finding that
structural power imbalances could establish coercion violative of the
violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be
limited to . . . plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities,
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; Art. 6(c).
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated."
United Nations, CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBuNAL - ANNEX TO
THE AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN AXIS ("London Agreement"), 8 Aug. 1945, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.eduiimt/imteonst.asp.
139. See generally IG Farben, 8 Trials of War Criminals 1081 (30 July 1948);
Ministries Case, 14 Trials of War Criminals 314(11 Apr. 1949).
140. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land ("Hague IV")
& Annex to the Convention: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 Art. 46 (entered into force
26 January 1910) ("Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property . . . must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated."). Id. at Art.
47 ("Pillage is formally forbidden.").
141. Id. at 1135.
142. IG Farben 8, supra note 139, at 1134.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
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Hague Convention even where there were no examples of direct
threats ordinarily found in examples of duress. In that case,
corporate entity IG Farben and its directors, Nazi Party members
and officials, were convicted, inter alia, of spoliation and plunder of
Polish, Norwegian, and French companies by acquiring controlling
interests in plants, factories, and other productive assets following
German occupation. 144 The Tribunal relied on its past findings that
"the Reich adopted and pursued a general policy of plunder of
occupied territories,"
carried out within the framework of the existing economic
structure. The local industries were put under German
supervision, and the distribution of war materials was
rigidly controlled. . . . Raw materials and the finished
products alike were confiscated for the needs of the German
industry. . . . Defendant Goering had issued a directive
giving detailed instructions for the administration of the
occupied territories. . . . The Goering order . . . was carried
out . . . so that the resources were requisitioned in a manner
out of all proportion to the economic resources of the
occupied countries, and resulted in famine, inflation, and an
active black market. 145
In relying on these findings, the Tribunal found IG Farben's
actions-exhibited through an "ever-present threat of forceful
seizure of the property by the Reich or other similar measures"-
were violations of the Hague Conventions. 146
But there are numerous examples where the Tribunal, despite
its earlier positions, found military occupation on its own as
sufficient to find unlawful coercion. For example, it found that "[t]he
power of the military occupant was the ever-present threat" in
certain IG Farben transactions, "and was clearly an important, if not
a decisive, factor. The result was enrichment of Farben . . . through
the medium of the military occupancy at the expense of the former
owners." 147 While establishing precedent for protecting against
coercive appropriation of the "economic resources of . . . occupied
144. Id. at 1150.
145. Id. at 1138 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
146. Id. at 1139.
147. Id.
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countries"148 based on legal analysis of the "compulsion and coercion
present"1 49 in agreements to acquire private property, the Tribunal
did not clearly demarcate the coercive effects of the mere presence of
a military occupying power from other conduct amounting to
acquisitions against an owner's will. Most of the facts pertaining to
Farben's acquisitions concerned the type of conduct that would illicit
civil liability or corruption charges in peacetime, but in the context
of wartime were found "coercive."150 The corporate conduct included
increasing stock capitalization in shareholder meetings without
shareholders from the occupied country being present 51 and using
relationships with the occupying authority to prevent license
issuance and the flow of raw materials.1 52
In the Ministries Case, a number of Nazi officials were indicted
for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity by
participating in the plunder of public and private property,
exploitation, and spoliation of countries under German
occupation. 5 3 As in IG Farben, the Tribunal was concerned with the
"economic program of the Reich" in controlling occupied territory.154
The case concerned the acquisition of a bank, steel plants, and
various private properties through: coercing owners to decrease
shares in companies and issue new shares in favor of Nazi owners;
obtaining consent for sale from Gestapo-held owners; and a
combination of conduct, including banking controls and policies,
"Aryanization tactics, and other police-state measures."15 5 In some
instances, the evidence of coercion consisted of "the use of threats
and concentration camps and Aryanization of [Jewish] holdings" in
banks. 50 In other cases, such explicit threats were not necessary for
establishing coercion. For example, the Tribunal found "ample
credible evidence in the record to satisfy beyond reasonable doubt
that [certain] acquisitions were accomplished in no small measure
through coercive measures," indicating "that the holders of the
invaded shares did not have much choice but to sell" to Reich
148. Id. at 1138.
149. Id. at 1146, 1149.
150. Id. at 1145-46.
151. Id. at 1144-45.
152. Id. at 1147.
153. Ministries Case, supra note 139, at 679-793.
154. Id. at 749.
155. Id. at 773, 777-78.
156. Id. at 773, 777.
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Ministry officials. 157 The evidence supporting this finding was
testimony by a former bank official:
Q. Did Mr. Kehrl [the Nazi official] in any of these
conferences use duress, or threaten you, or make any
attempt to induce you in any way to do anything you did not
want to do?
A. I can answer that question with yes. Mr. Kehrl did have
us do various things which we did not want to do, and which
we would never have done without his suggestion. It was not
necessary for Mr. Kehrl to threaten us personally. We were
quite aware of who Mr. Kehrl was, and Mr. Kehrl never
made any secret of it. For example, when, immediately after
15 March, he came to Prague and said that he had to take
over armament concerns for Goering, we realized what was
going on; in our position such suggestions were orders of the
Reich authorities, the Reich government, and all the power
of the Third Reich. 58
Further, in the context of the German acquisition of control of steel
plants, the Tribunal found the following evidence sufficient:
Kehrl participated in and directed . . . the taking over of
actual control and custody of the . . . plants, pending the so-
called negotiations for their purchase, inasmuch as he
caused to be appointed a German, Henke, to take over the
operation of [the plants], on the flimsy pretext that the
managers in charge could not operate it properly. Obviously
this ... was done for the benefit of the German economy. If it
were to be claimed that this was done only to preserve public
order and safety, we find irrefutable contradiction thereto in
the thinly disguised and coercive steps taken to acquire the
plant through the ostensible buying of control. 159
157. Id. at 756.
158. Id. at 756-57.
159. Id. at 759.
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Thus, in the Ministries Case, as with IG Farben, findings of
widespread economic coercion depended not just on direct personal
threats, but on broader assessments of structural relationships.
These judgments provide both a precedent and a model for
theorizing and evaluating economic coercion claims at the structural
level. First, in assessing whether unlawful economic coercion
occurred, the Tribunal looked to the empirical economic benefit it
provided the coercing power beyond the necessities of the military
occupation. Yet, while the Tribunal was facially neutral to the
military occupiers' right to requisition within the bounds of the
Hague Conventions, it nevertheless allowed the structural
relationship the occupation elicited serve as a basis in and of itself
for finding unlawful conduct. Thus, while evidence of involuntary
consent was usually necessary-whether of explicit physical threats
(the exercise of "police-state measures" like confinements) as well as
implicit threats and indirect conduct (mere identifications of one's
position within the military occupying power's hierarchy)-the
Tribunal allowed for an inference of coercion even where no physical
force was exerted, explicit threats were made, and evidence pointed
to voluntary agreements.
B. Regulating Individual Economic Coercion by Public and
Private Actors
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) both establish an economic rights framework and a core
set of obligations that implicate economic coercion, neither explicitly
prohibits economic coercion.160 Yet, the equality and liberty
principles established in those and other human rights instruments
provide a basis for delineating protections from such coercion. This
and the following Section delineate a foundation and basis for
expanding the narrow role economic coercion plays in contemporary
economic rights protections and debates in human rights law.
The UDHR. establishes "rights and freedoms" so "every
individual and every organ of society" may "strive . . . to promote
160. See generally United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217A, UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., 1st Plen.
Mtg., UN Doc. A/810 (12 December 1948) [hereinafter "UDHR" or "Declaration"];
ICESCR, supra note 136.
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respect [there]for," "and by progressive measures," "to secure their
universal and effective recognition and observance."16 1 The
Declaration declares that all human beings "are born free and equal
in dignity and rights" (Art. 1) and grants "[e]veryone . . .
entitle[ment] to all the rights and freedoms set forth [therein]
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status" (Art. 2). Everyone is granted "the right to life,
liberty and security of person" (Art. 3) and slavery and the slave
trade are prohibited "in all their forms" (Art. 4). All people are
declared equal before the law, are entitled to equal protection along
with rights to effective remedies before an independent and
impartial tribunal (Arts. 6-8, 10), and have the right to own
property "alone as well as in association with others. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property" (Art. 17). Freedom of thought
and opinion are guaranteed along with rights to conscience, religion,
expression, peaceful assembly and association (Arts. 18-20). Explicit
economic rights under the UDHR include rights to: social security
and the realization of "the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
personality" (Art. 22); to work, free choice of employment, just and
favorable conditions of work and protection against unemployment
(Art. 23); equal pay for equal work (id.); just and favorable
remuneration "ensuring himself and his family an existence worthy
of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of
social protection" (id.); to form and join trade unions "for the
protection of his interests" (id.); and to "rest and leisure, including
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with
pay" (Art. 24). Finally, the UDHR lists rights to standards of living
for adequate health and well-being, including the rights to: food,
clothing, housing, medical care, necessary social services, security,
education, and participation in the cultural life of the community
(Arts. 25-27). In the exercise of these rights, "everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society" (Art. 29(2)).
161. UDHR, supra note 160, at Preamble, T 8.
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The JDHR thus establishes a framework for procedural and
substantive rights, as well as principles for their enforcement and/or
limitation. Protection against economic coercion is consistent with
the substantive rights and obligations the UDHR establishes and
the principles it establishes for their interpretation. For example,
freedom from coercion is protected through the rights granted to
freedom of thought and conscience, and individual rights to be free
from the coercive power of the State are recognized in rights to
access and proper procedures before a court of law, without
discrimination (Art. 2). Substantive economic rights are also granted
and any limitation on those rights is regulated by civil and political
rights, principles of equity, and the requirement that any such
limitation be "solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society" (Art. 29). Thus, to the extent any economic rights
to property, social security or work are limited, the limitation must
accord due respect to the rights of others and balancing against the
general welfare.
The ICESCR follows the language and individual rights model of
the UIDHR almost exactly, but expands the scope of protections with
regard to coercion. First, it establishes guidelines for interpreting
and applying the obligations set out in therein:
Art. 2(1): Each State Party . . . undertakes steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
Art. 4: States Parties ... recognize that, in the enjoyment of
those rights provided by the State in conformity with the
present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to
such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as
this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and
solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a
democratic society.162
162. Id. at Art. 2(1), 4.
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Additionally, the Covenant instructs that nothing therein "shall be
interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy
and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources" (Art.
25).
Like the UDHR, the ICESCR establishes principles of non-
discrimination on the basis of "race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status" (Art. 2(2)) and ensures equal rights between men and
women (Art. 3). Part III grants almost identical economic rights as
those under the UDHR but provides more explicit detail to those
rights: to work, "which includes the right of everyone to the
opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses and
accepts" (Art. 6); to just and favorable conditions of work (including
fair wages, equal pay for equal work, decent remuneration, safe and
healthy working conditions, equal opportunities for promotion, and
periods of rest and leisure (Art. 7); to join trade unions and strike
(Art. 8); to social security and social insurance (Art. 9); and to an
adequate standard of living for individuals and their families (Art.
11). By not only granting economic rights but also securing a right to
improve one's economic circumstances, the ICESCR more concretely
establishes a progressive ideal of economic betterment. Also, as in
the UDHR, limitations on economic rights are allowed only to the
extent they are not discriminatory, they are in accordance with law
compatible with the Covenant's terms, and they exist "solely for the
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society"
(Arts. 1-5).
Despite the foundational nature of economic coercion claims at
Nuremberg and the rights and principles established in the UDHR
and ICESCR, the ICESCR's treaty-monitoring body, the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter,
"CESCR"), has rarely addressed coercion directly. 163 A keyword
search in the Committee's jurisprudence database returns no
opinions referencing "coercion,"16 4 and it is referenced in only two
163. For the Optional Protocol's complaint mechanism, see Optional Protocol to
the ICESCR, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force 23 March 1976), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ Professionallnterest/Pages/OPCESCR.aspx.
164. Jurisprudence, United Nations Hum. Rights Off. of the High Commissioner,
http://juris.ohchr.org.
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General Comments on health care and gender equality. General
Comment No. 14, "The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of
Health" (2000), clarifies States Parties' obligations as including the
obligation to "refrain from . . . applying coercive medical
treatments"16 5 and clarifies that States are obligated to "prevent
third parties from coercing women to undergo traditional practices,
e.g., female genital mutilation ... ."166 General Comment No. 16 on
"The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" clarifies that Article 10 of the
ICESCR requires States Parties "to ensure that ... boys and girls
should be protected equally from practices that promote child
marriage, marriage by proxy, or coercion."16 7 Coercion is not
mentioned in any other General Comment, including the CESCR's
2005 General Comment No. 18 on the Right to Work. And while the
cited references could conceivably touch on aspects of economic
165. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 14, The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 22d sess., at 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), reprinted in Compilation of Gen. Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 85 ¶ 34, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003) [hereinafter CESCR, Gen. Comment No. 14] (emphasis
added).
166. CESCR, Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 165, at T 35 (emphasis added).
Prior to the General Comments, the Convention for the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women [hereinafter CEDAW] issued General
Recommendation 19 on Violence Against Women, which referenced coercion in a
similar but broader context in relation to gender-based violence. CEDAW, Gen.
Recommendation 19, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1993). The Committee clarified that
"[t]he definition of discrimination" in the treaty included "gender-based violence,"
such as "acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such
acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty." The Recommendation also targeted
"[t]raditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men or as
having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving violence or
coercion, such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid
attacks and female circumcision," noting that, "[t]he abrogation of their family
responsibilities by men can be a form of violence, and coercion. These forms of
violence put women's health at risk and impair their ability to participate in family
life and public life on a basis of equality." CESCR, Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note
165, at 243 1$ 6, 11, and 23 (2003) (emphases added).
167. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 16, The
Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights at 7, ¶ 27, U.N. Doe. E/C.12/2005/3 (2005) [hereinafter CESCR, Gen.
Comment No. 16] (emphasis added).
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coercion-for example, economic rights associated with marriage-
they do not target economic coercion per se.
The limited attention to coercion in other sources of international
law concentrates on its prohibition in the workers' rights and
trafficking contexts. Still, even the Conventions of the International
Labor Organization (ILO) rarely mention coercion. None but one of
the ILO's Fundamental Conventions mention it-the Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention of 1967 (No. 105)-one of two core
Conventions prohibiting forced labor.168  But even then, the
reference to coercion indicates more concern for ideological than
economic coercion: "Each Member . .. which ratifies this Convention
undertakes to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or
compulsory labour-(a) as a means of political coercion or education
or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views
ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic
system." 169 Coercion, economic or otherwise, is not even mentioned
in the ILO's formative Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, which memorializes four "core labor standards":
freedom of association, from forced labor, from child labor, and non-
discrimination in employment. 170 However, the ILO has discussed
168. ILO Convention No. 105 Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour,
adopted June 25, 1957, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-3, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 at Art. 1
[hereinafter Abolition of Forced Labour Convention]. Aside from Convention No. 105,
the ILO categorizes its core conventions into the following: the Forced Labour
Convention (No. 29) (1930); Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention (No. 87) (1948); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining
Convention (No. 98) (1949); Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100) (1951);
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111) (1958);
Minimum Age Convention (No. 138) (1973); Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention (No. 182) (1999). Conventions & Recommendations, ILO,
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-
standards/conventions-and-recommendations/ang--en/index.htm.
169. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, supra note 168, Art. 1 (emphasis
added).
170. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Followup, adopted June 18, 1998, Annex revised June 15, 2010, at 2. Neither
"coercion" or related terms are listed in the ILO's "Online ILO Thesaurus," a self-
described "compilation of more than 4,000 terms relating to the world of work. . . in
English, French, and Spanish . . . [which] covers labour and employment policy,
human resources planning, labour standards, labour administration and labour
relations, vocational training, economic and social development, social security,
working conditions, wages, occupational safety and health and enterprise
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coercion in responding to Direct Requests and making Observations,
both with reference to Convention No. 105 and under domestic law
of State Members in its Observations and Reports from the ILO's
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA). 17 1 The CFA has
documented, in multiple cases, State Member "anti-coercion" laws
limiting trade union activity against employers and third parties. 172
Where coercion has taken on revived significance is in field of
combatting human trafficking. Still, the only extant, legally-binding
international human rights instrument with an agreed definition of
"human trafficking"-UN Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime-circumscribes its prohibition in the context of
organized criminal activity only.173 In the Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children (the "Palermo Protocol"), a supplement to that Convention,
States Parties are obligated to criminalize human trafficking, take
preventive measures, and provide protection for trafficking
victimS.174 The Palermo Protocol defines "trafficking" as
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the
promotion." ILO Thesaurus, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/inform/online-information-
resources/terminology/thesaurus/lang--en/index.htm.
171. ILO NORMLEX database, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p
NORMLEXPUB:1:0::NO::: (search "coercion" and all derivative terms).
172. For recent examples, see, e.g., Turkish Motor Workers' Union, Int'l Transp.
Workers' Fed'n & Int'l Trade Union Confederation (Case No. 3098), ILO Rep. on the
Comm. of Freedom of Assoc. No. 375, at 532-59, GB.324/INS/6 (June 13, 2015) (in
part discussing criminal activity of union leaders who used coercive measures to
force membership, thus "violating job and employment freedoms"); Nat'1 Union of
Workers of Venezuela, et al. (Case No. 3059), Rep. on the Comm. of Freedom of
Assoc. No. 375, at 631-65, GB.324/INS/6 (June 13, 2015) (discussing the use of the
Bolivarian National Guard to disperse a peaceful trade union protest).
173. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. GAOR, 11th sess. Annex I, at 25, UN Doe.
A/55/383 (2000); Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res.
55/25, Annex II, at 4 (2001).
174. See generally Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, U.N. GAOR, 55th sess., Annex II, at 53,
U.N. Doe. A/55/383 (2005) [hereinafter Palermo Protocol] (providing specific articles
detailing obligations to fulfill these purposes).
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giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person, for
the purpose of exploitation. 175
The use of "coercion" in this definition appears to capture non-
physical threats or uses of force, including psychological and
economic coercion, such as debt bondage. 76 Regional human rights
instruments have also prohibited coercion in the context of
trafficking.17 7
Notwithstanding the Palermo Protocol and its evidencing a
growing attention by the human rights community to coercion, the
international human rights framework does little to identify,
conceptualize or robustly protect against economic coercion per se.
Coercion, like exploitation, is a phenomenon that "goes to a large
extent unremarked" in international human rights law. 178 Those
instruments, monitoring bodies, and even UN Special Rapporteurs
tasked with investigating human rights violations have not
addressed the problem of economic compulsion within the economic
rights framework. There are two core likely reasons for this: (1) a
historical reluctance to recognize the justiciability of economic rights
claims; and (2) the dominance of the "progressive realization"
framework of economic rights.
175. Id. at Art. 3(a) (emphasis added).
176. The U.S. Department of State has at least taken this position. See Office to
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, "What is Modern Slavery?",
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/what/. See also Bethany Hastie, Doing Canada's Dirty
Work- A Critical Analysis of Law and Policy to Address Labour Exploitation
Trafficking, in LABOUR MIGRATION, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS (Ato Quayson & Antonela Arhin, eds., 2012) (interpreting the
Palermo Protocol to apply to economic coercion such as debt bondage).
177. See Council of Europe, CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN
HUMAN BEINGS CETS No. 197 (entered into force 2008) (using identical definition of
"trafficking in human beings" as used in Palermo Protocol, but broadening its scope
to prohibit trafficking transnationally and within a single country, and targeting not
only organized criminal activity but also trafficking by individuals without ties to
organized crime). Regional human rights instruments also prohibit coercion in the
context of sexual exploitation. See, e.g., AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND
WELFARE OF THE CHILD, Art. 27: Sexual Exploitation.
178. Susan Marks, Exploitation as an International Legal Concept, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT 282 (S. Marks ed. 2008).
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C. Limitations of the International Human Rights Approach to
Economic Coercion
From their earliest formulations, economic, social, and cultural
rights were viewed as distinct from civil and political rights, at least
in part on non-justiciability grounds. 7 9 The distinction is manifest
in the decision to draft separate covenants for civil and political
rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on
the other-the ICCPR and ICESCR-on the basis that:
civil and political rights were enforceable, or justiciable, or of
an "absolute" character, while economic, social and cultural
rights were not or might not be; . . . the former were
immediately applicable, while the latter were to be
progressively implemented; and . . . generally speaking, the
former were rights of the individual "against" the State,...
while the latter were rights which the State would have to
take positive action to promote. Since the nature of the civil
and political rights and that of economic, social and cultural
rights . . . were different, it was desirable that two separate
instruments should be prepared.1 80
Scholarly arguments reinforcing the non-justiciability of socio-
economic rights have been both prescriptive and descriptive.
Prescriptively, legitimacy concerns regarding the "unelected branch"
179. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the
Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695 (1979); Frank Cross, The Error of Positive
Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001); Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart,
Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an
International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water,
Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L. L. 462 (2004) (applying justiciability critique
to international level); William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History,
Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1824 (2001) (surveying
resistance of US constitutional scholarship to welfare rights on justiciability
grounds); Aryeh Neier, Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF
1, 1-3 (2006) ("The concern I have with economic and social rights is .... we get into
a territory that is unmanageable through the judicial process . . . . Economic and
security matters ought to be questions of public debate.").
180. Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human
Rights, UN Doc. A/2929 (1955), at 7.
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deciding matters of economic and social policy have been raised. 8 1
Descriptively, concerns about'the institutional capacity of the courts
to properly evaluate and adjudicate such claims are prominent.1 82
Setting aside the fact that various national constitutions have
explicitly granted protections for economic and social rights, and
those rights are adjudicated in domestic courts as a matter of
course, 8 3 what these positions reveal is a predilection towards
viewing economic rights as positive, state-granted rights of
entitlement rather than as rights that are adjudicated in private law
every day. These private law adjudications also constitute state-
sanctioned enforcement of economic rights claims with broad
distributional effects. While the economic rights framework requires
states to "respect, protect, and fulfill" rights under the ICESCR, and
those obligations have been extended to private actors, the
international legal framework has failed to catch up and assess how
State-level adjudication of economic coercion implicates State
obligations under international human rights law.
Second, the "progressive realization" model of economic, social
and cultural rights has generally bypassed how private law
adjudication can violate economic rights and the principles and
concerns of non-discrimination, equity, and the general welfare in
the context of economic coercion claims. State Party obligations
under the ICESCR to "take steps.. . to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights," 8 4 reflect the view that socio-economic rights are
181. See KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
133 (2012) ("The concerns of justiciability are based on opposing extremes: the
problems of judicial usurpation on the one hand, and judicial abdication on the
other.').
182. Id. See also ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 89-90
(2014).
183. For an overview of such adjudications in Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain,
Hungary, the UK, Canada, South Africa, India, the Philippines, Argentina,
Colombia, and the EU, see JUSTICIABILITY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS:
EXPERIENCES FROM DOMESTIC SYSTEMS (F. Coomans ed., 2006).
184. Compare ICESCR, Art. 2(1), supra note 136, with Art. 2(1) of the ICCPR,
999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 / [1980] ATS 23 / 6 ILM 368 (1967). It should be
noted that not all human rights instruments adopt a "progressive realization" model
in relation to economic, social and cultural rights. The African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, for example, does not set qualifications or limitations on State
Party's obligations allowing for "progressive realization" or respecting a State Party's
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merely "aspirational" as compared to civil and political rights, which
are "inalienable and immediately enforceable." 185 Still, the CESCR
has taken aggressive positions on "progressive realization,"
requiring "deliberate, concrete, and targeted steps," and, with a
number of Special Rapporteurs,1 86 invited attempts to develop
indicators and use benchmarks to measure the enjoyment of and
improvement on socio-economic rights protections within States
Parties' jurisdictions.18 7 Indicators and benchmarks can document
improvements in States Parties' provision of health care or
education, but the exclusive focus on advancing State Party
provision of a basic social safety net to its citizens ignores broader
distributional priorities, implemented and sanctioned by the State,
that have already designated and continue to designate economic
rights beneficiaries in the context of private law.
Over the past twenty years, States Parties' obligations under
international human rights treaties have evolved to include
obligations to "respect, protect and fulfill" human rights. 8 8 These
obligations include injunctions to refrain from interfering with or
resource constraints. See OAU Doc. CABILEG/67/3 rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58
Arts. 15, 16 (1982) (entered into force 21 October 1986).
185. See, e.g., Richard Wall, U.S. public delegate to 59th Session of UN
Commission on Human Rights, providing U.S. views on Item 10, "Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights," (7 April 2003), in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart, eds., 2003).
186. See, e.g., CESCR, Gen. Comment No. 15, at ¶ 54 (designating adjustable
targets for States Parties to achieve each reporting period, or "scoping"); CESCR,
Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 165, at 1 58 (same); Secretariat of World
Conference on Human Rights, REPORT ON OTHER MEETINGS AND ACTIVITIES, at ¶
153, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/73, 22 (20 April 1993) (special expert meeting
concluding that setting indicators must rely on clarifying content of rights and
obligations); Special Rapporteur Danilo Turk, REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, ¶ 7, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/19 (6 July 1990) (calling for
"indicators [to] ... assist in the development of the 'core contents' of some of the less
developed rights in th[e] domain [of economic, social and cultural rights]").
187. See, e.g., Donnelly, The West and Economic Rights, supra note 3; HUMAN
RIGHTS: POLITICS AND PRACTICE (M. Goodhart ed. 2009); Russel Barsh, Measuring
Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and Purpose, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 87 (1993);
Maria Green, What We Talk About When We Take About Indicators: Current
Approaches to Human Rights Measurement, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1062 (2001);
AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: Measuring
Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INTL LAW 253 (2009).
188. See, e.g., Gen. Comment No. 12, at ¶ 15; Asbjorn Eide, The Right to Food as
a Human Right, UN Doc. E/CN4/Sub.2/1987/23 (1987).
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curtailing the enjoyment of rights, protecting individuals and groups
against human rights abuses, and taking positive action to facilitate
the enjoyment of basic rights. 189 Further, the CESCR, regional
human rights tribunals, and various national constitutions have
begun to recognize the "horizontal effect" of States Parties'
obligations as applied to private actors.190 This horizontal
application of rights protections "recognises, assigns, enforces and
enables observance of private socio-economic obligations" through
state protection of economic and social rights.1 91 The recognition of
horizontahty has evolved from the "recognition that the state acts
whenever structures of private and public law are enforced[,]
indicat[ing] that . . . human rights, which are conventionally
understood as protecting individuals from the actions of government,
extend to private relationships between individuals." 19 2 Thus, the
law is evolving to more broadly recognize State Party obligations
when state action regulates private conduct in violation of States
Parties' obligations under human rights law.
In sum, while the traditional economic rights framework and
protections after Nuremberg have been burdened by non-
189. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
(OHCHR), What Are Human Rights?, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx.
190. See, e.g., CESCR, Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 165, at IT 12, 42, 51
(states obliged to ensure equity of health care services "whether privately or publicly
provided" and violate those obligations when they fail "to regulate the activities of
individuals, groups or corporations so as to prevent them from violating the right to
health of others"); Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR): Case of
Gonzdlez et al. ("Cotton Field") v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of November 16, 2009, Series C No. 205
(establishing State's obligations in relation to acts committed by private actors under
a due diligence standard), and Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 28 ILM 291 (1989)
(establishing States' "duty to ensure" rights granted in the American Convention of
Human Rights as against private actors); European Court of Human Rights (ECHR):
Guerra v Italy, 19 February 1998, and Lopez Ostra v, Spain, 9 December 1994
(finding violations where state authorities failed to regulate private waste treatment
plant disposal and factory releases of toxic substances), Case of X and Y v. The
Netherlands (1985) Series A, vol. 91 (Convention creates State obligations that
involve "adoption of measures designed to secure private life even in the sphere of
the relations of individuals between themselves'); S. Afr. Const., § 8; Liith, BVerfGE
7, 198 (1958) FCC.
191. Marius Peiterse, Relational Socio-Economic Rights, 25 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS.
198, 216 (2009).
192. YOUNG, supra note 181, at 179.
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justiciability concerns and a focus on "progressive realization," the
law is shifting towards a broader recognition of the role of private
law adjudication in evaluating whether States Parties are
respecting, protecting, and fulfilling economic rights obligations. It is
therefore an opportune time to propose a way forward for
incorporating economic coercion claims into the economic rights
framework. This Article puts forward two means of doing so. First,
the traditional view of economic rights as "positive," state-granted
entitlements must take into account and integrate economic coercion
claims as existing and already realized relational rights. Recognizing
and protecting such rights is a key component of adapting economic
rights enforcement to all state action, including its sanctioning and
regulation of private conduct. Further, because the relational rights
approach requires judicial analysis of how competing economic
interests get resolved relative to broader welfare interests, it allows
for a more detailed record of how States Parties are understanding
and meeting their obligations under international human rights law.
Second, in their evaluation of the enjoyment of economic rights
protections, treaty-monitoring bodies, Special Rapporteurs,
international human rights experts and scholars should apply the
standards of economic rights protection to assess the extent to which
economic coercion is regulated and the justifications provided
therefore across substantive law areas in which economic coercion
claims are being adjudicated. Only by taking a full view of such
adjudication can a comprehensive and accurate picture of economic
rights enjoyment emerge.
IV. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EcONOMIC COERCION
PROTECTIONS WITHIN AN ECONOMIC RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
A. A Relational Rights Theory of Economic Coercion
The coexistence of gains and losses in a coercive environment
cannot be understood as a matter of chance or as mere social
epiphenomena-coercion claims implicitly and often explicitly
concern a forceful deprivation of liberty or welfare interests for
another's benefit. The "force" in economic coercion claims requires
that the respective rights of coercer and coercee be viewed and
sorted relationally in the context of distributional concerns. Coercive
conduct challenges rights allocations as between a coercer and
coercee: if the coercee was coerced to perform acts for the coercer's
benefit, the coercer may not be entitled to the fruits of those acts,
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and the proper distribution of rights to those fruits must be allocated
based on an understanding of the coercer-coercee relation. This
relational aspect requires that economic coercion not only be
assessed as a liberty interest infringement, but also, in relation to
welfare interests that implicate distributional policy. Further, to the
extent the economic "force field" places a broader set of actors into
play, the relational nature of the rights adjudicated cannot be
limited to the coercer and coercee.
Laurence Tribe's discussion of relational rights is useful here. He
defined as "relational" all constitutional rights that "are necessarily
inalienable: individuals cannot waive them because individuals are
not their sole focus,"193 and included as one of those rights the "right
secured by the thirteenth amendment's command that 'slavery' not
'exist within the United States."' 194 These rights were relational
because they corresponded to
systemic norms - norms concerned with structuring power
relationships to avoid the creation or perpetuation of
hierarchy in which some perennially dominate others.
Individual rights, which operate as individually held vetoes
over government action, are inadequate to vindicate such
relationship-focused norms. These norms serve not only to
recognize spheres of personal autonomy, but also to replace
vertically stratified patterns of power with more horizontal
and egalitarian arrangements-between accuser and
accused, between governors and governed, between the
Union and the States, between those who hold power and
those who aspire to it. Indeed, the very process of translating
ideas about relationships into purely individualistic values
may be destructive of what those ideas seek to capture.195
Tribe goes further to prescribe that, "[w]hen such rights are . . .
concerned with capacities that persons are unable to exercise
193. Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 333
(1985).
194. Id. at 335.
195. Id. at 332-33. Tribe describes an even broader constitutional basis for
relational norms in the structure of the Constitution's separation and division of
powers, and "the need for deliberate diffusion of power to combat the hegemony of
any single group or faction." Id. 333 n.14.
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without assistance, their systemic and inalienable character gives
rise, in turn, to affirmative government duties to facilitate the
exercise of such capacities at public expense," and "to protect such
rights from the distortions of a purely private market."196 While
Tribe argued that the rule of the judiciary "in mandating the
government's performance of its affirmative duty to ensure the
relational aims of such rights" was significant, he called on
"lawmakers, executive officials, scholars, [and] citizens" to ensure
the "full protection of these rights" through developing "a
constitutional discourse that is not constrained by the often narrow
boundaries of judicial capacity and competence."19 7
While lacking in constitutional stature, rights against economic
coercion are equally relational as rights against slavery under the
Thirteenth Amendment. They are concerned precisely with the types
of power distribution and domination concerns and suffer the same
vulnerability to ineffective remedy if understood within a purely
individual rights model. That coercion protections implicate
distributive concerns as between the government and the private
realm, as between rightsholders, and as between rightsholders
relative to their receipt of government benefits has been at the core
of each of the philosophical, legal, and international human rights
accounts offered herein, and economic coercion protections are no
less implicated.1 98
Coupled with the below measures for protecting against
economic coercion, viewing the right not to be unlawfully subject to
economic coercion as a relational right facilitates the development of
a theory of economic coercion in accordance with the minimal
requirements gleaned from the above accounts. It recognizes that
such a theory must account for the exercise of state's coercive
economic power on individual autonomy and explain that exercise in
terms of social utility and the enforcement of a network of economic
rights. It also enables the recognition of the significance of private
law adjudications and horizontal relationships-as well as vertical
relationships as between the state and rightsholders-in the
workings of economic coercion and implicates both the empirical and
196. Id. at 333-34.
197. Id. at 343. For a recent development of this injunction, see Joseph Fishkin
& William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669 (2014).
198. For this tripartite evaluation of distributive concerns resulting from
coercion, see Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 54, at 1421, 1490-91.
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normative or moral components of economic coercion in the
justification of any deprivation of protection. To more fully explore
the potential value of recognizing a right against economic coercion
as a relational economic right, the next Section proposes the benefits
of its integration within the economic rights framework and the
institutions that secure their protections.
B. Measuring Protections Against Economic Coercion as an
Economic Right
Borrowing from the Legal Realists, we can describe the field of
economic coercion adjudication, across substantive areas of law, as a
convergence of competing distributional claims establishing a
network of relational rights. Thus, economic coercion claims are the
explicit, if often clumsy, attempt by plaintiffs, prosecutors, and
others to achieve sovereign, or even international institutional
correction for perceived distributive wrongs. The historical and
contemporary body of economic coercion claim adjudications can
thus be viewed as an already existing system of economic rights
jurisprudence ripe for benchmarking and evaluation in any
jurisdiction, allowing the tracking of economic rights compliance
through tracking where and when judicial bodies have shaped the
economic landscape and economic liberties in favor of some over
others. The critical project, then, is to integrate the criteria and
principles that emerge from these adjudications into broader
jurisprudence and thought on economic rights.
As already discussed, the progressive realization model has
elicited various metrics for measuring rights enjoyment while also
recognizing the validity of state resource constraints, the most
prominent of which being a "minimalist" approach to economic and
social rights. This approach proposes development of "core" rights
and "minimum" protections to serve as baselines from which State
parties either may not derogate or which must be prioritized above
all other economic achievements.199 This "minimalist" framework
has been put forward by the CESCR, as well as human rights
scholars eager to establish priorities in the enforcement of economic
199. See YOUNG, CONSTITUTING RIGHTS, supra note 181, at 66-98 (discussing
efforts to define "minimum content" of economic rights). See also HENRY SHUE, BASIC
RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1996).
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rights protections. 2 0 0 The establishment of "core" obligations allows
for "organizing principles," such as principles of availability and
accessibility, that can serve to operationalize and build a substantive
component to "core" rights within a given domestic jurisdiction.201
There have been many critiques of the "minimum core"
approach. Those critiques range from a concern that the broader
goals of socio-economic rights are compromised by minimalism, to
skepticism that a "minimum core" could ever be adequately
determined, to its focus on developing countries while ignoring
developed countries, further frustrating a democratic deficit in
international institutions.202  From the perspective of economic
coercion claims, perhaps the most devastating critique is that
"minimalism fails to recognize the defects and contingencies of our
inherited political (and economic) institutions."203 By focusing
exclusively on whether basic levels of subsistence are available to a
given national population, the "minimum core" prioritizes
substantive achievement over equity, ignoring potential rights
violations that may result from discrimination and distributional
inequities, and setting an arbitrary "minimum" achievement level
relative to existing, but unjustified, resource allocations.
Challenges to "minimalism" have also been directed more
broadly to the "progressive realization" model and the reliance on
200. See CESCR, REPORT ON THE FIFTH SESSION, SupP. No. 3, Annex III T 10,
UN Doc. E/1991/23 (1991) [hereinafter General Comment No. 3] (focusing on the
"minimum essential levels" of food, health, housing and education); MATTHEW
CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON EcONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 131-32 (1995) (minimum core offers
conceptual assistance in imposing accountability for retrogressive measures).
201. See SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS, supra note 199, at 160; CESCR, THE RIGHT OF
EVERYONE TO THE ENJOYMENT OF THE HIGHEST ATTAINABLE STANDARD OF
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH, ¶¶ 33-40, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.1 (1 March
2004) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt); CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT No.
15: THE RIGHT TO WATER (ARTS. 11, 12), UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003),
at 1 12 ["GENERAL COMMENT NO. 15"]; CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 14, supra
note 166, at T 12; CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 18: THE RIGHT TO WORK (ART. 6),
at ¶ 12.
202. See, e.g., Brigit Toebes, The Right to Health, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK (Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause, & Allen Rosas,
eds., 2d ed. 2001); CRAVEN, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 200.
203. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING RIGHTS, supra note 181, at 90.
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indicators and benchmarks that it engenders. 204 "Progressive
realization" assumes that States Parties to human rights
instruments begin as a tabula rasa, that the allocation of economic
rights is yet to occur, and its obligations consist of a progressive,
increased provision of entitlements to secure their enjoyment. But,
as already discussed, the existing network of allocating and
protecting economic interests-whether vertically, through
government-granted protections, subsidies, and entitlements, or
horizontally, through judicial adjudication of economic disputes-is a
system of economic rights that has already been realized. Thus, the
incorporation of economic coercion claims can critically supplement
the economic rights framework to allow evaluation of where
substantive economic rights have been compromised and reveal
where background principles for interpreting economic rights
enforcement (e.g., the interpretive obligations of antidiscrimination,
equity, and general welfare balancing established in the ICESCR)
are being ignored in economic rights adjudications.
But while the range of economic coercion cases can provide a
detailed picture of economic rights enjoyment to benefit a broader
picture of compliance with international standards - from the
ground up, so to speak - developments in existing economic rights
adjudication can also provide guidance and a principled approach to
economic coercion adjudication from within international and
comparative law frameworks, or "from the top down." Important
developments in international human rights law and the
constitutional adjudication of economic rights provide a key model
for: (1) making analysis of economic coercion claims across
substantive areas of law conform with economic rights adjudication
standards; and (2) by doing so, allowing more easy integration of
economic coercion claims into economic rights jurisprudence and
discourse. Specifically, a "culture of justification" has evolved within
economic rights jurisprudence requiring courts to: establish reasons
for limiting economic rights, utilize proportionality principles, and
make broader welfare assessments which can be drawn from to
elaborate standards to apply to economic coercion claims.205 Further,
204. See, e.g., Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 187, at 256-58 (highlighting
negative consequences of turn to an "accounting culture").
205. For a discussion of the "culture of justification," see YOUNG, CONSTITUTING
RIGHTS, supra note 181, at 99-129. See also Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where?
Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AnR. J. HuM. RTS. 31 (1994)
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this culture of justification has elaborated a structural framework
for adjudicating economic rights as relational rights, and by doing
so, providing a crucial counterpoint to the existing framework
grounded in state-granted entitlements that are "progressive
realized."
The ICESCR establishes a foundation for a culture of
justification by establishing principles for limiting the enjoyment of
economic rights.206 On this foundation, a range of procedural and
legal standards have emerged, from placing burdens of proof on
rights-limiting parties to establishing reasonableness and
proportionality tests. 207 For example, in applying reasonableness
tests to determine whether economic or social rights have been
infringed, the South African Constitutional Court has examined:
[The nature of the duty, the social and economic context in
which it arises, the range of factors that are relevant to the
performance of the duty, the extent to which the duty is
closely related to the core activities of the duty bearer ...
and the extent of any threat to fundamental rights should
(distinguishing "culture of justification" in new South African Constitution from
apartheid-style "culture of authority"); Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of
Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 464, 464-71
(1992).
206. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 136, Art. 2 (establishing principles of non-
retrogression and anti-discrimination), Art. 3 (ensuring equal rights of men and
women), Art. 4 (requiring any rights limitation be only as determined by law,
compatible with nature of social, economic and cultural rights at issue, and be solely
for purpose of promoting general welfare in a democratic society). See also UDHR,
supra note 160, Art. 29(2).
207. See Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 165, 1 28; Amrei Mtiller, Limitations
to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
557, 572 (2009). For requiring justification of limitations on reasonableness grounds,
see S. Afr. Const. § 36 (1996). See, e.g., Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, (6)
SA 505 (CC) (2004) (finding legislative restriction on welfare benefits for non-citizen
permanent residents violative of right to equality and access to social, applying
reasonableness test); Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, (5) SA 721
(CC) (2002) (finding unreasonable and violative of the right to health Government's
refusal to provide antiretroviral drugs to pregnant mothers); Government of the
Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, (1) SA 46 (CC) (2001) (applying
reasonableness test to find Government infringement of right to housing);
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal (1) SA 765 (CC) (1998) (applying
reasonableness test in right to access health care claim).
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the duty not be met as well as the intensity of any harm that
may result.208
In evaluating these factors, "[dietails of the precise character of the
resource constraints . . . in the context of the overall resourcing of
the organ of the state will need to be provided." 209 Further, local
knowledge, claimant expectations, and "meaningful engagement"-
either through direct "proactive and honest engagement" with
claimants or "respectful face-to-face engagement or mediation
through a third party"-may influence reasonableness
assessments.2 10
In other domestic and regional settings, proportionality
limitations have functioned as standards for evaluating rights
infringements by weighing any rights limitation with the
proportionate aims and means of the infringing conduct. 2 11
Ordinarily, a two-stage analysis is performed where the court first
asks whether an act infringes the scope of a given right, and if it
does, finds a-violation and moves to the second step: determining
whether the infringement is justified.2 12 Proportionality analysis
offers "transparency to a . . . judicial assessment by revealing to the
public all the ingredients of the decision-making calculus."213
It is important to recognize a number of caveats before deriving
lessons from these applications for economic coercion adjudication.
First, there are genuine institutional competency concerns in having
courts make determinations about economic rights when that may
best be left to the democratic branches of government. Second, not
all, if any, economic coercion claims implicate constitutional rights,
and while such claims may implicate economic rights under the
208. Rail Commuters Action Group v. Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail, (2) SA 359
(CC) (2005); Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v. Minister of Environmental Affairs, (4) SA
490 (CC) (2004).
209. Rail Commuters, at ¶ 88.
210. See Grootboom, at 1 87; Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers,
(1) SA 217, T 39 (CC) (2005).
211. See generally DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159-88
(2004) (discussing how the European rights system as well as domestic jurisdictions
- Germany, Canada, India and Israel - apply proportionality tests in assessing
violations of constitutional rights).
212. See YOUNG, CONSTITUTING RIGHTS, supra note 181, at 126 (citation
omitted).
213. Id. at 129.
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ICESCR, the ICESCR neither directly nor explicitly prohibits
economic coercion per se (even if later instruments do in the contexts
of trafficking, gender-based violence, and discrimination).
As to the first concern, courts are already making and will
continue to make determinations that impact the regulation of
economically coercive acts or conduct. Second, reasonableness and
proportionality tests are applicable in evaluating economic coercion
adjudication because they constitute state action creating,
allocating, and deciding between competing economic interests.
Since they involve a determination of an economic right,
international human rights instruments dictate that the
determination comport with principles of anti-discrimination, equity,
and consideration of the general welfare. Judicial documentation of a
court's justifications and reasoning would better comply with those
dictates and provide a better understanding of how courts weigh the
broader social costs of their decisions in the sphere of economic
coercion, where both liberty and welfare interests are implicated. 214
Given that, we can glean from the evolution of reasonableness
and proportionality tests a more robust set of standards applicable to
adjudication of economic coercion across substantive areas of law.
Specifically, when economic coercion is at issue, courts can utilize
standards laid out in economic rights adjudication to consider the
liberty and welfare restraint alleged relationally. Following the
standard first step in proportionality analysis, courts would assess
whether an alleged coercer's conduct infringes the scope of any
economic liberty and welfare interests of the coercee. In determining
whether or not an infringement has occurred, a court would evaluate
not only whether judicial ratification of a coercer's economic right
would substantively hinder coercees' rights (property rights, the
right to work, to social security, etc.), but also, whether it would
hinder the coercee's access to those rights. If such an infringement
were found, then the burden would be placed on the coercer to justify
the infringement as "reasonable." Courts would evaluate
214. See DAVID KELLEY, A LIFE OF ONE'S OWN: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE
WELFARE STATE 22 (1998) ("Liberty rights set conditions on the way in which
individuals interact. Those rights say that we cannot harm, coerce, or steal from each
other as we go about our business in life, but they do not guarantee that we will
succeed in our business.... Welfare rights, by contrast, are intended to guarantee
success, at least at a minimal level. They are conceived as entitlements to have
certain goods, not merely to pursue them.")
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reasonableness in conformity with principles of anti-discrimination,
equity, and general welfare protection, applying a multi-factor test
assessing: the nature of the deprived economic and liberty interest;
the social and economic context in which that interest arises; to what
extent the coercer's conduct violated the coercee's ability to consent
or asset; what it would require of the purported coercer to promote,
respect, and fulfill those interests the extent doing so is closely
related to the core activities of the coercer; the extent to which
failure to promote, respect, and fulfill those interests would harm
the coercee; whether the purported coercer meaningfully engaged
with the coercee to prevent the infringement; and how a resulting
decision would impact general welfare interests.
Rather than merely look at the narrow context of a coercive offer
or threat, this broader approach expands the baseline and requires
more searching analysis of the context of coercion and its general
welfare costs. 215 Such broad evaluations are not unheard of in
judicial adjudication of private economic harms, including in the
United States. For example, when tasked with assessing whether
antitrust defendants have unlawfully acquired or maintained a
monopoly, or unlawfully reached certain kinds of unlawful
agreements to restrain trade, courts require a balancing of their
alleged anticompetitive conduct with any procompetitive benefits
215. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 175-176, comments (b)
& (c) (limiting the determination of duress to whether the coercee "has a reasonable
alternative to succumbing and fails to take advantage of it," and making the test of
inducement subjective); Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§
7102(3), (5), (6), (9) & (10), 7104 (restricting definitions and analysis of "coercion,"
"debt bondage," "involuntary servitude," "severe forms of trafficking in persons, and
"sex trafficking" to the individual coercee, "threats of serious harm or physical
restraint," schemes "intended to cause" coercee "to believe that failure to perform an
act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against" that coercee, and
"abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process" "in order to exert pressure on
another person to cause that person to take some action or refrain from taking some
action," even while requiring Executive action to "establish and carry out
international initiatives to enhance economic opportunity for potential victims of
trafficking as a method to deter trafficking"); National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 152, 158 (containing no definition of "coercion," but making it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of" their Section 7 rights (Section 8(a)(1)) and for a labor organization or its
agents "to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise" of their Section 7 rights as
well as "to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or m an
industry affecting commerce" through secondary activity (Sections 8(b)(1) & (4))).
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generated by the conduct. 2 16 The application of the "rule of reason"
test evaluates considerable evidence put forward by both parties and
requires a wide-ranging analysis of economic effects in the relevant
market at issue.2 17 The evidence and judicial balancing this test
would elicit would not only provide more robust metrics for
evaluating the bases of judicial economic rights allocations, but
would also allow for a better accounting of wealth transfers through
the courts.
In addition to incorporating economic coercion claims into the
broader economic rights framework and applying broader
proportionality and reasonableness tests to their adjudication, what
is critical for a more comprehensive understanding of both the
substance of and mechanisms for evaluating economic coercion
claims is a more detailed history of economic coercion. By a history of
economic coercion I do not mean a catalogue of instances of economic
exploitation throughout history, but rather, a history of how
economic coercion has been construed and adjudicated both as a
means of maintaining or intervening in economic relationships, as
well as a means of establishing and policing the conceptual
parameters of "economy" and "freedom." While the Legal Realist
project sought to reappropriate concepts central to American
substantive law within their respective areas of provenance,
economic coercion accounts, whether philosophical, jurisprudential,
or historical, ought to document how the concept of economic
coercion has been elaborated in diverse areas of substantive law,
including criminal law, poverty law, antitrust law, labor law, and
trade law.
A historical and legal analysis of case law in various substantive
areas of law would serve at least four purposes. First, it would
historicize the adjudication of economic coercion to map the
contingency of the concept and its dependence on contemporaneous
understandings of economy and freedom, offering a window into how
economic coercion as a core legal concept was influenced by historical
216. See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990)
(rule of reason analysis is a way of determining "whether ... anticompetitive effects
outweigh .. . precompetitive effects"); Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36
(1977); Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curium); 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW T 1504-1507 (3d ed. 2010).
217. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 216, at ¶¶ 1504-1507.
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realities and shaped, not just judicial ordering, but the social and
economic consequences of that ordering. Central questions to explore
would be what theories of economy and freedom are being assumed
or deployed in adjudicating claims of economic coercion, and what
does the law treat as relevant when evaluating whether economic
coercion exists and should be sanctioned? Second, tracing the
regulation of economic coercion through the courts would reveal a
broad tradition of economic rights adjudication and would secure
economic coercion claims as a central and determinative component
of economic rights jurisprudence. Third, by drawing out the
assumptions, background economic realities, and deeper
conceptualizations behind theories of economic coercion applied in
these various contexts, an overarching assessment would bring these
areas of law in direct conversation with one another as a means of
better developing a more profound and complex understanding of
how the effects of economic coercion on the individual and society is
conceived. Fourth, exploring diverse approaches to economic coercion
in the law and extrapolating the central values that inform them
would inform a more comprehensive theory of economic coercion that
would be adaptive and responsive to current economic realities in
the context of a globalized economy.
Prospective surveys must not only assess what the law has
deemed relevant for evaluating whether economic coercion exists
and should be sanctioned, but also, what the law considers evidence
of economic coercion, how determinations of economic coercion were
and are reliant on contemporaneous economic theories, how those
theories informed views of economic forces and the extent to which
those forces were conceived to impact rights, and the moral integrity
of individuals and communities. For example, in looking at the
criminalization of economic coercion, a study could focus on
theorizations of economic coercion in the evolution of the prohibition
of slavery, forced labor and human trafficking as economic coercion
is understood as invasion and displacement. In the context of labor
law and the right to work, economic coercion assessments could
concentrate on the evolution of the individual to collective labor
protections, as well as legal constraints regulating labor's ability to
"coerce" employers by placing pressure on non-employers through
secondary activity, boycotts, and other mechanisms of influencing
the supply chain. In international law, and specifically in trade law,
it could highlight how the law has shifted from accounting for
economic coercion as a means of influencing state actors to a means
2016] 1135
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of internalizing, through economic forces, forms of social ordering
and non-economic values. By exploring the adjudication of economic
coercion in various substantive areas of law, the study of economic
rights would benefit from being able to evaluate and compare
competing conceptions of economic coercion in order to formulate a
more robust prohibition of economic coercion as a regulating legal
category, as a necessary component of protecting economic rights,
and as a tool for combatting global inequality. At the same time,
generality need not be the enemy of the specific: where substantive
areas of law have evolved doctrinal rules that best effectuate
protections against coercion, deviations from general principles on
coercion can be effectuated through the doctrine of "subsidiarity,"
which can provide that relief may be sought through doctrine
specific to a substantive area of law rather than broader principle. 2 18
CONCLUSION
This article argues that existing accounts of economic coercion,
conceptually and in the law, need significant supplementation and
research attention as a historical matter and for the purposes of
deeper doctrinal analysis. Core to this larger project is an attempt to
understand how processes of determining when and where economic
coercion has occurred constitute and reconfigure procedural and
substantive rights, while clarifying how the judiciary shapes those
rights. If rights, as Amartya Sen has argued, are "pronouncements
in social ethics, sustainable by open public reasoning," it is crucial
that those pronouncements be clearly and exhaustively heard within
a context most fruitful for framing them.2 19 Without an
understanding of how such rights are constituted and bestowed
relationally, and in the thick context of philosophical and social
assumptions about the nature of the economy, freedom, and broader
welfare interests, the enjoyment of economic rights cannot properly
be measured and assessed.
218. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING RIGHTS, supra note 181, at 123-24 (citation
omitted).
219. Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
315, 355-56 (2004).
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